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FOREWORD
While the American defense community has naturally been preoccupied with the extensive transformation of the U.S. reserve components in recent years,
equally critical developments in the reserve policies of
the world’s other major military powers have received
less attention. The inevitability of continued American
engagement with these countries means that their
changing policies are highly relevant to the United
States. American defense planners should therefore
keep abreast of ongoing alterations in these countries’
reserve components and, in certain cases, might wish
to adjust their own forces and policies in response.
The Reserve Policies of Nations provides a
comprehensive assessment of these issues as well as
a wealth of data on recent developments affecting the
reserve policies of many of the world’s leading military
powers: Australia, Britain, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Israel, Japan, and Russia. By assembling this
material in a single volume, Dr. Richard Weitz and
the Strategic Studies Institute hope to make it easier
for readers to comprehend these changes and develop
insights regarding their implications.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Throughout the world, military reserves are
changing. National governments are transforming
the relationships between their active and reserve
components; the allocation of roles and responsibilities
among reserve forces; and the way they train, equip, and
employ reservists. One central precept is driving these
changes: Nations no longer consider their reservists
as strategic assets suitable primarily for mobilization
during major wars. Whereas previously they managed
reservists as supplementary forces for use mainly
during national emergencies, major governments now
increasingly treat reservists as complementary and
integral components of their “total” military forces.
This increased reliance on reserve components
presents national defense planners with many
challenges. Recruiting and retaining reservists has
become more difficult as many individuals have
concluded they cannot meet the additional demands
of reserve service. Reservists are increasingly deployed
on foreign missions at a time when expectations
regarding their contributions to the management of
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other domestic
emergencies are growing. Defense planners must also
continue to refine the optimal distribution of skills
and assets between regular and reserve forces. Finally,
national governments need to find the resources
to sustain the increased use of reservists without
bankrupting their defense budgets or undermining
essential employer support for the overall concept of
part-time soldiers with full-time civilian jobs.
Governments have adopted innovative responses
to the complications associated with their growing
vii

use of reservists. To ease the pressures resulting from
the increased convergence of reserve and active-duty
deployment schedules, defense policymakers have
tried to make rotation cycles more predictable and compatible with reservist lifestyles. In addition, the major
military powers have widely adopted “total force”
policies that treat their active and reserve components as
integrated if not totally interchangeable elements. They
have done so sometimes explicitly, sometimes just in
practice, but always with major implications for a wide
range of defense policies. National militaries are altering
the relationship between their reserve and active-duty
forces as they restructure both. Government policies
increasingly treat mobilized reservists and regular
forces similarly—harmonizing their organizational
structures, compensation packages, and rules and
regulations—as they link the two components more
tightly. Nevertheless, many reservists still complain
about their perceived second-class status regarding
training opportunities, the quantity and quality of their
equipment, and their treatment by field commanders
when deployed on active duty.
The convergence in the roles and missions of
countries’ reserve and active components invariably
raises questions over the appropriate distribution
of skills between the two. Since part-time soldiers
normally find it difficult to match the competencies
of full-time professionals, governments have had
to decide where the comparative advantages of
reservists lie. Although reservists continue to perform
traditional defense support functions, such as reararea security and logistics, they have recently assumed
new responsibilities. These novel tasks often reflect
the special skills and assets reservists can bring from
their civilian lives to their military roles. In many highviii

technology fields, for instance, the human resource
capabilities present in a country’s civilian economy
exceed those readily available in the defense sector.
One problem with this approach, however, is that
many people join the reserves to pursue an occupation
different from that of their civilian jobs. For this reason,
several governments have adopted a formal policy of
not requiring reservists to perform the same functions
when on military duty that they do during their civilian
jobs, except in emergencies.
Many countries have decided to retain certain skills
predominantly in their reserve components, especially
those skills they find impractical to maintain in sufficient
quantity in their regular forces. For example, some
medical specialties are rarely needed in peacetime,
but become essential in wartime for helping severely
wounded soldiers. In several cases, defense planners
have assigned certain skills and missions exclusively
to reservists. Although this practice helps keep costs
down, the result has been a de facto globalization of
the Abrams Doctrine: It has become nearly impossible
for a country to go to war without mobilizing at least
some of its reserve components.
Reservists are often seen as providing an essential
link between a country’s military profession and its
civilian society. According to this view, reservists help
transmit values between the two communities and limit
undesirable divergences between them—an important
societal concern even if few people expect the military
to try to seize power through coups in the nations under
study. One result of this link is that national militaries
have become more susceptible to broader societal
trends. In most contemporary developed countries,
for example, force planners must deal with declining
birth rates, a growing population too old for military
ix

service, and a decreasing interest in military careers
among young adults. Widespread changes in attitudes
regarding women, however, have provided military
recruiters with a new source of potential enlistees.
The declining size of many national reserve
components, combined with an increased tendency
for both regular and reserve forces to be drawn
predominantly from certain—often disadvantaged—
social groups, appears to have weakened the
effectiveness of this military-civilian link. In response,
foreign governments have restructured their reserve
components to expand opportunities for military
service.
Another noteworthy development in civil-military
relations has been reservists’ increasingly important
role in ensuring their fellow citizens’ safety and
security during domestic emergencies. Governments
are expanding the capabilities, authorities, and
missions of reservists in order to improve their
ability to support civilian first responders following
natural disasters, major accidents, and terrorist
attacks. Officials increasingly recognize that reserve
components can supply unique niche capabilities in
the area of homeland security. Reservists can offer
emergency responders advance military capabilities
and skills without requiring governments to depend
on overstretched regular forces, whose use at home
could present legal and other problems. In addition,
they often exhibit excellent situational awareness given
their close ties to the surrounding civilian communities.
As in the United States, however, foreign governments
are still defining the proper roles of their militaries in
the area of homeland security.
Providing these new capabilities invariably raises
the financial costs of the reserve components at a time
x

when many major military powers are trying to cut their
defense budgets. National military establishments are
reducing the size of both their active-duty and reserve
components, but the cuts in the regular forces have
typically been greater because reservists are thought
to be more cost-effective. As governments spend more
on training, equipping, and compensating reservists,
however, the cost differential between the active and the
reserve components decreases. A particularly expensive
development has been the extension to reservists of
health, education, and other benefits traditionally only
offered to regular soldiers. With the roles of reserve
and regular forces increasingly indistinguishable on
the battlefield, it becomes ever harder, both morally
and politically, to deny reservists perquisites enjoyed
by active duty soldiers. Overcoming recruitment and
retention problems among reservists has also become
expensive. To fill the ranks, governments have had to
employ more recruiters, fund additional advertising,
and provide more generous salaries and benefits.
Governments also confront the increasingly
expensive burden of sustaining employers’ support
for their reserve employees due to the increasing
demands placed upon reservists. On the one hand, the
growing time commitment demanded from reservists
for training and deployments has made them anxious
about potential damage to their civilian careers,
especially in terms of job promotion and retention. At
the same time, competitive pressures have led even
strongly patriotic employers to complain about the
costs of supporting their frequently absent reservist
employees. Most governments have responded by both
strengthening (or in some cases introducing for the first
time) legal employment protections for reservists and
providing greater monetary compensation and other
benefits to their employers.
xi

Still another factor that complicates determining the
relative cost-effectiveness of reservists is the difficulty
of evaluating the tradeoff between the lower average
salary of nonmobilized reservists and the various
legal and practical restrictions on their use for certain
operations (e.g., the typically longer time needed for
their predeployment training). It is more cost-effective
to keep certain infrequently needed specialist skills
predominately in the reserve components, but recent
experience has shown that defense planners often
underestimate their active-duty requirements for
these skills. Even when adequate aggregate capacity
exists, miscalculations have resulted in the frequent
mobilization of certain skilled reservists, creating
increasing recruitment and retention problems until
governments “rebalance” their allocation of skills
between the reserve and active components.
Finally, calculating the costs and benefits for the
civilian economy of using reservists is even more
complex. When reservists perform their military duty,
employers lose their immediate services and incur
costs related to hiring replacement workers as well
as paying for overtime and temporary coverage. Yet,
some personnel expenses decline when the reservists
go on leave. In addition, civilian employers often
benefit from the tangible (e.g., specialized training)
and intangible (e.g., leadership) skills that reservists
acquire from their government-paid training. The
net effect of these disparate factors varies depending
on each case. Estimating their aggregate effect across
the entire national economy is considerably more
complex.
The overwhelming scale of the transformation in the
U.S. reserve components has diverted attention from
these equally sweeping adjustments taking place in
xii

the reserve policies of other major military powers. Although many of these changes resemble those affecting the U.S. armed forces, national differences persist
due to countries’ varying histories, constitutional
principles, human resources, economic capabilities, and
threat perceptions. Since the United States will continue
to engage with these military powers—in cooperation,
conflict, or both—the U.S. defense community needs to
keep abreast of these developments and differences. In
certain cases, American defense planners might wish
to adjust their own forces and policies to respond to—
or even preemptively influence—changes in foreign
countries’ reserve policies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION—
THE RESERVE TRANSFORMATION:
THE CHANGE TO CHANGE
Throughout the world, military reserves are
changing. National governments are transforming
the relationships between their active and reserve
components; the allocation of roles and responsibilities
among reserve forces; and the way they train, equip,
and employ reservists. One central precept is driving
these changes: Governments no longer consider
reservists as constituting primarily a strategic asset
for the “big” war. Whereas previously they managed
reservists as supplementary forces for use primarily
during national emergencies, they now treat reservists
as complementary and integral components of their
“total” military forces.
National security officials have traditionally
considered their reserve components as a vital
mobilization base for expanding the number of troops
they could field in a major conflict. For less demanding
scenarios, they viewed reservists as helping keep
active-duty tours within acceptable bounds and
providing regular forces time for relief, recovery, and
restructuring. Although national governments today
still expect reservists to augment active-duty forces
and perform essential rear-area support functions,
almost all of them have adopted new force employment
policies that presume reservists’ participation in most
military activities. These tasks encompass peace
operations and humanitarian disaster relief missions
in largely permissive foreign environments, as well
1

as more challenging counterterrorist, post-conflict
stabilization, and front-line combat operations in the
world’s hot zones. Since the end of the Cold War, the
declining prospect of a full-scale military mobilization
has led defense planners to develop more refined callup procedures. War plans now envisage mobilizing
specific reserve units or even specific individuals for
each mission. When reservists sign up today, they do
so with the expectation of being mobilized at least once
during their period of service.
The overwhelming scale of the transformation in
the U.S. reserve components has diverted attention
from the equally sweeping adjustments taking place in
the reserve policies of other major military powers. Although many of these changes resemble those affecting the U.S. armed forces, national differences persist
due to countries’ different histories, constitutional
principles, human resources, economic capabilities, and
threat perceptions. Since the United States will continue
to engage with these military powers—in cooperation,
conflict, or both—the U.S. defense community needs to
keep abreast of these developments and differences. In
certain cases, American defense planners might wish
to adjust their own forces and policies to respond to—
or even preemptively influence—changes in foreign
countries’ reserve policies.
Chapter 2 reviews the transformed structure and
roles of the U.S. reserve components. Subsequent
chapters survey some of the principal developments
in the reserve policies of the world’s other major
military powers. Reflecting the information available,
they discuss changes in the size, function, and use of
their national reserve components. These chapters
also highlight innovations in policies designed to
increase recruitment and retention, improve relations
2

with employers, and expand the range of reserve
opportunities through the creation of new categories
of reservists. The concluding chapter assesses the
implications of these changes and offers some
considerations for U.S. policymakers.

3

CHAPTER 2
THE UNITED STATES
Most Americans interested in military affairs have
naturally focused on the revolutionary transformation
occurring within the U.S. armed forces. Since the end of
the Cold War, the size of both the U.S. active and reserve
components have declined by approximately onethird. At the same time, American military personnel
have experienced a sharp increase in their operational
tempo. Reservists were seldom used during most of the
Cold War, supplying on average less than one million
days of duty annually before the August 1990 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. By 2003, however, the members
of the U.S. reserve components were providing 63
million days of duty per year. The average length of a
reservist’s tour of duty has also reached levels not seen
in over half a century—exceeding 300 days on average
in recent years. This surge began in the 1990s with
the U.S.-led military interventions in Somalia and the
former Yugoslavia,and from 1996 to 2001, members
of the U.S. reserve components annually provided on
average about 12.5 million days of duty per year. The
recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have made clear
the extent to which the U.S. reserve components were
being employed as an operational rather than strategic
force.1
As in other countries, the U.S. military reserve
structure reflects the nation’s distinct historical
origins, security requirements, and constitutional
principles. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
is unique, however, in having seven major distinct
reserve components within its subordinate military
departments. The Department of the Army contains
5

two reserve components: the U.S. Army Reserve and
the Army National Guard. The Department of the Air
Force includes two reserve components as well: the
Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. The
Department of the Navy has three reserve components:
the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the
Coast Guard Reserve, which falls under Navy control in
wartime. Since U.S. states and territories lack their own
navies and the Marine Corps is too small to sustain a
federal force structure, the U.S. Constitution authorizes
only the Army and Air Force have state-based National
Guard components. The relatively large number and
diversity of these structures make it likely that certain
foreign practices could provide insights and lessons
for at least some U.S. reserve components.
The September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks
underscored the vital contribution of reservists in
supporting American civil authorities and homeland
defense. The authoritative 2005 Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support called for greater “attention
on better utilizing the competencies of the National
Guard and Reserve Component organizations” in
these missions.2 The members of the National Guard
are widely deployed throughout the United States,
sometimes even working as emergency responders
in their localities. For centuries, they have assisted
communities stricken by natural disasters. In addition,
Title 32 of the United States Code grants the National
Guard unique legal privileges in operations on U.S.
territory. For instance, Guard members operating in
both Title 32 and state active duty status can legally
undertake a much wider range of domestic law
enforcement activities than regular federal forces
(which are governed by Title 10).3 Finally, while DoD
officials have insisted that almost all U.S. regular forces
6

must train and equip primarily for combat operations,
National Guard leaders have evinced somewhat more
interest in developing certain dual-capable units
optimized for both all-hazards homeland security
emergencies and overseas military missions.4
Since 9/11, federal and state leaders have
mobilized thousands of reservists as part of Operation
NOBLE EAGLE—the post-9/11 campaign to maintain
air sovereignty over the United States—and other
domestic counterterrorist missions. Members of the
Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard conduct
approximately three-fourths of the flying missions
for NOBLE EAGLE.5 The Army National Guard
(ARNG) has created new units to help operate the
U.S.-based elements of the evolving ballistic missile
defense architecture. The ARNG is also establishing
55 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support
Teams (WMD-CSTs), at least one in each U.S. state
and territory. Each WMD-CST consists of 22 highly
trained specialists who, like all Guard members, can be
federalized in an emergency. Although limited by their
small size and lack of organic long-distance transport,
these teams can help emergency responders detect
threatening chemical, biological, and radiological/
nuclear (CBRN) agents and provide advice on how to
respond. The ARNG is also creating a dozen CBRNE
Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs) within
the United States.6 These 120-member units include
medical, chemical, engineering, and rescue teams
trained to help manage the consequences of a range of
catastrophes. The Congress has sought to enhance the
effectiveness of state national guards by allowing them
to establish a National Emergency Assistance Compact
(EMAC). This arrangement enables state governments
to receive help from National Guard units in other states
7

on an expedited basis. The difficulties in responding to
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 led to widespread
discussion about possibly expanding the military’s role
in domestic emergencies unrelated to acts of terrorism.
Consequently, DoD has since augmented the planned
role of military reservists in responding to future
natural disasters.7
Even before Katrina, Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan and neighboring
regions revealed major problems with the way DoD
managed its reserve components.8 For example,
some small businesses and self-employed reservists
have suffered undue income loss, while mobilized
reservists have encountered unequal compensation,
inadequate healthcare, and other difficulties.9 DoD
systems for tracking reservists (especially members of
the Individual Ready Reserve), as well as their skills
and experience, have also proved inadequate to the
challenge. These data management difficulties have
contributed to an excessively long and unresponsive
mobilization process. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF) has exposed further problems, including the
inadequate training, equipping, and funding of U.S.
reserve components.
The prominent reserve presence in OIF—as of
November 2005, 40 percent of all U.S. forces fighting
in Iraq belonged to the reserve components10—has
ensured widespread awareness of these deficiencies.
The subsequent public criticism reinforced internal
pressures within DoD to change long-standing
policies in its reserve components. The definitive 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report acknowledges
that the “strategic reserve” approach of the Cold War
is largely outdated. In its assessment, “The Reserve
Component must be operationalized, so that select
Reservists and units are more accessible and more
8

readily deployable than today.”11 The magnitude
of the ongoing transformation of the U.S. reserve
components becomes evident when one considers that
they represent almost half of all American military
personnel.
Each of the military branches has launched various
initiatives to optimize the contributions of their reserve
components to the new security challenges of the 21st
century. For example, the Army Reserve has identified
“Six Imperatives” to guide its transformation efforts:
reengineering the mobilization process, transforming
command and control, restructuring units, improving
human resources, building a rotational-based force,
and improving individual support to combatant
commanders.12 Under its recently implemented
Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRRI), the
Army Reserve has begun reducing its nondeploying
force structure by cutting headquarters staffs and
consolidating training and command structures.13
Through the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) process, the Army Reserve is eliminating or
realigning a higher percentage of facilities than any
other component. All its 125 new Armed Forces Reserve
centers will be shared with a reserve component from
at least one other military service. To reduce the length
of required pre-deployment training and elevate the
collective preparedness of its members, the Army
Reserve has adopted a new Army Reserve Training
Strategy of “train-alert-deploy” in place of the Cold
War-era model of “alert-train-deploy.”14
All these measures aim to buttress the new Army
Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The concept
employs a force rotational model that assumes
sustained Army Reserve deployments will remain a
feature of U.S. military operations for the indefinite
9

future. It seeks to generate, train, and equip Army
Reserve “force packages” capable of deploying to a
theater of operations for up to 1 year during any 5 year
period. The corresponding cycle for the Army National
Guard envisages one deployment window every 6
years. According to former Army Chief of Staff General
Peter Schoomaker, the aim of these complementary
rotation systems is to generate 18-20 Brigade Combat
Teams (BCT) “indefinitely.”15 When not mobilized
for missions, regular and reserve Army units cycle
through various phases of refitting, retraining, and
reequipping. Army Reserve force planners anticipate
that the predictability of the ARFORGEN will make its
deployment obligation more acceptable to reservists,
their families, and their employers.16
The Army is also adopting a new modular structure
for both its active and reserve components. By more
effectively mixing and matching active and reserve
units, the reorganization would create a rotational pool
of some 70 BCTs and 200 Support Brigades. At present,
Army planners intend to field 117 modular brigades in
the Regular Army, 106 in the Army National Guard,
and 58 in the Army Reserve.17 The Army Reserves
have established an “Individual Augmentee Program”
to supplement this new system of rapidly deployable
modularized units. An associated Worldwide
Individual Augmentation System will make it easier
for the combatant commands to access Individual
Augmentees with needed skills.
The Navy and Air Force, which began to experience
force structure stress during the U.S.-led military
interventions of the 1990s, adopted new deployment
systems based on rotating “force packages” even before
the Army. Among other objectives, these systems
attempt to make active and reserve deployments more
10

predictable, especially for enduring “steady-state”
operations. Even in the absence of another major war
or other national emergency, all three Services expect
to rely on their reserve components to help meet at
least some of their routine operational requirements.
Besides these separate Service initiatives, DoD
has sought to make its reservists more effective by
enhancing their capacity to operate jointly with
members of the other military branches. The intent
is to extend the level of “jointness” now achieved
among regular forces to the reserve components. In
recent years, increasing numbers of reservists have
served on joint staffs and in joint billets.18 The National
Guard Bureau (NGB), a federal body that administers
U.S. Government programs involving the state Army
and Air National Guard forces, has led many of these
efforts. Although still focused on the needs of the Army
and Air Force, the NGB has established direct ties with
the Joint Staff and combatant commanders to address
their reserve requirements. In addition, the NGB has
collaborated with other DoD bodies to develop joint
doctrine, education, training, and exercises for issues
related to homeland security. Its newly established Joint
Continental United States Communications Support
Enterprise (JCCSE) links many of these commands to
state, local, and federal government homeland security
stakeholders. In addition, the NGB has consolidated
the three previous guard headquarters in each U.S.
state, territory, and the District of Columbia into a
single joint force headquarters for each location. An
important function of these streamlined bodies is to
help provide reservists with more opportunities to
enroll in joint professional military education courses—
either residential or through Internet-based distance
learning—as well as to acquire joint duty experience.19
11

DoD has sought to make reserve assets more
rapidly available for operations by shortening the
time required for their mobilization. At the same time,
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2003
directed the Department to end the active component’s
dependence on reserve mobilizations during the initial
phase of any rapid military operation. To this end, the
Department has begun reducing the disproportionate
concentration of certain skill sets in the Reserve
Components. In the U.S. Army, for instance, at the end
of January 2004 when the “rebalancing” process had
just begun, approximately 60 percent of the combat
structure, 54 percent of the combat support structure,
and 69 percent of the combat service support structure
resided in the Army Reserve and Army National
Guard. In some areas, the disparities were even starker.
At that time, some 97 percent of the Army’s civil affairs
units, 72 percent of psychological operations units, 72
percent of the hospitals, and 70 percent of medical
units belonged to the Army Reserve alone.20
As of March 2006, the Army Reserve was still
providing 96 percent of the Army’s civil affairs units
and two of the Army’s three Psychological Operations
groups—as well as 30 percent of the Army’s total
combat support and 45 percent of its combat service
support capabilities.21 The Army Reserve and Army
National Guard also retain primary responsibility
for support functions relating to homeland security,
information technology, logistics and transportation,
military police, and protection against CBRN agents.22
Since many of these occupations draw on specialized
civilian skills that would be expensive to duplicate
widely in the regular forces, it might prove prohibitively
expensive to rely solely on regular forces and reserve
volunteers during even the first weeks of major military
operations.
12

These disparities reflect the historical legacy of
the so-called “Abrams Doctrine.” General Creighton
Abrams, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 197274, allegedly placed certain essential military assets
in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard in
order to make it difficult for the United States to fight
another Vietnam-scale military operation without
mobilizing the reserves. His intent was supposedly
to discourage U.S. presidents from launching major
wars that would lack widespread popular support.
Due to their different histories, smaller sizes relative
to their corresponding regular components, and recent
rebalancing efforts, the reserve components of the Air
Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard contain
a more balanced mix of capabilities that complement
the assets resident in their respective active-duty
components. Nevertheless, the Air Force depends
on volunteers from its reserve components to supply
certain flight crews and maintenance personnel
required to keep two of its Aerospace Expeditionary
Forces (AEFs) readily available for routine 90-180 day
deployments. The Air Force Reserves also provide
about half of the Air Force’s aggregate strategic airlift
capacity. 23 The Navy similarly relies on its reservists to
provide most of its military intelligence, fleet support
airlift, and coastal warfare capabilities.24
Through rebalancing the mix of tasks and capabilities between the active and reserve components, DoD
has sought to ensure that the regular forces possess
sufficient organic assets to initiate any operation
without large-scale mobilization of the reserve
components (which would also have the undesirable
consequence of alerting potential adversaries of
the impending military action).25 In particular, the
military services have sought to augment certain high13

demand/low-density (HD/LD) combat support and
combat service support assets hitherto found largely
in their reserve components. This process has involved
both creating more regular units with these capabilities
and transferring military personnel from lesser-used
military specialties to these overstretched fields.
According to official data, the military branches have
rebalanced approximately 70,000 positions within or
between the various active and reserve components.
The services intend to rebalance more than 50,000
additional military personnel by 2010.26 The 2006
Air Force and Navy Posture statements review their
rebalancing achievements as well as their recent
efforts to increase integration between their Services’
active and reserve components (e.g., the creation of
a USAF Total Force Integration Directorate).27 The
Army Posture statement similarly highlights its
“rebalancing” of capabilities between Army Regulars
and Army Reservists.28 Even after these changes,
however, the U.S. military will continue to rely on the
reserve components for most large-scale operations,
especially during the post-conflict reconstruction
phase. Any occupation force will need personnel with
skills widely available in the civilian world such as
civil affairs, psychological operations, military police,
civil engineering, and medical and dental care.
DoD policymakers have also proposed changes
in legislation to improve the Department’s access
to its reserve components, especially for potential
homeland security missions. The Bush administration
has requested that Congress amend Title 10 USC
12304 (the Presidential Reserve Call Up Authority),
which enables the activation of reserves without a
declaration of a national emergency to supplement the
available volunteers in the event of a natural disaster.
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The administration desires to extend the maximum
length of active duty service under this authority from
270 to 365 days. It also desires greater legal flexibility
to access the consequence management capabilities
resident in the reserve components to support U.S.
civil authorities during a domestic emergency (defined
as a “serious natural or manmade disaster, accident or
catastrophe”).29
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CHAPTER 3
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Like their American counterparts, British defense
officials now recognize that the United Kingdom
Reserve Forces (RF) will participate in most military
operations rather than solely as a last resort to counter
direct threats to British territory. A July 2004 Ministry
of Defence (MOD) report states, “Our Reserve Forces
have evolved from a large but little used force to one
that is ready and capable of providing an integrated
component of Defence, structured to support more
frequent expeditionary operations either as individual
reinforcements in key specialist areas, or as formed subunits.”30 Starting with the interventions in Kosovo and
Bosnia, the RF have participated in most British combat
and peace support operations during the past decade.
Current MOD force employment policy, which reflects
a new “culture of mobilization,” anticipates that RF
members will be called up for active duty at least once
during their service commitment. Britain also adheres
to a “total force” concept that holds that reservists
should be treated indistinguishably from active-duty
troops when they work together on operations.
The British reserves consist of two main components: the Regular Reserve and the Voluntary Reserve
Forces (VRF). Regular Reservists are former members
of the Regular Forces who are still liable for compulsory
mobilization. For example, discharged Regular Army
personnel are required to join the Army Regular
Reserve, subject to diminishing obligations with age.
Regular Reservists primarily constitute a standby rather
than a ready reserve. The British government no longer
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expects to mobilize them except in times of national
emergency (though the MOD did recall 420 Regular
Reservists for service in Iraq in 2003). The main Regular
Reserve components are the Army Reserve; the Royal
Air Force Reserve (RAFR); and the Royal Fleet Reserve
(RFR), which consists of former Royal Navy and Royal
Marine regulars. Each Regular Reserve component
also has a small contingent (typically ex-regulars) who
volunteer to extend their reserve liabilities.31
The training and mobilization obligations of
Regular Reservists depend on such factors as their age,
sex, and length of regular service. They fall into one
of four main categories. First, members of the Officer
Reserve have a compulsory training obligation of 4-6
years after leaving regular or reserve service. Second,
Regular Reservists are subject to compulsory training
for as many as 6 years after their discharge. Third,
members of the Long-term Reserve have completed
their Regular Reserve obligation, have no additional
training obligation, and serve until they reach 45 years
of age. Finally, military pensioners are former activeduty personnel who have completed “pensionable
service.” They have a legal liability for recall up to the
age of 60 without a training obligation. For financial
and other reasons, some former active-duty members
also join the VRF after leaving regular service, giving
them a dual reserve status.32
The government now relies primarily on the VRF
for most deployments. VRF members commit to
at least 27 days of training each year, though some
specialist units, whose civilian and military skills
often overlap, have a minimum commitment of only
19 days. Their training commitment typically entails
1 night per week, 1 weekend per month, and 2 weeks
of continuous duty each year. This “annual camp”
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occurs either at a military training establishment, as an
attachment to a regular unit, as part of a formal military
exercise, or a combination of these elements. Since the
2-week training often provides the only opportunity
for the entire reserve unit to train together, reservists
are expected to take leave from their regular job to
participate. The MOD offers extra volunteer training
opportunities to reservists who wish to acquire special
skills. The Ministry also periodically uses reservists’
training time to deliver actual military support (e.g.,
manning operational centers, unloading ships, or
evacuating medical casualties from overseas) for
overstretched regular forces. Although this practice
provides reservists with more realistic training, it can
deprive them of opportunities to exercise other basic
skills.
Approximately 40,000 members currently serve in
the VRF. Some 85 percent of them consist of people
who have joined the Territorial Army (TA) directly
from the civilian community. Along with members of
the Army Reserve, TA volunteers comprise the main
part of the Army Ready Reserve. The remaining parttime voluntary reservists belong to the Royal Naval
Reserve, Royal Marines Reserve, and the Reserve Air
Force. Some VRF members have previously served
on active duty, though this is not required. Certain
members of the Regular Reserve join the VRF to keep
their military skills sharp through its requirement for
periodic training. The duration of reservists’ period
of mobilization varies but typically ranges from 312 months, which includes time for pre-deployment
training, post-deployment leave, and reintegration
into civilian society.
The size of the British reserve components has
declined in recent years, along with a corresponding
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decrease in the number of active-duty personnel.
According to annual editions of The Military Balance,
compiled by The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the number of British reservists fell from
340,100 in 1990, to 302,850 in 2000, to some 272,500 in
2005. In comparison, the size of the active-duty forces
declined from 306,000 troops in 1990, to 212,450 troops
in 2000, to almost 206,000 troops in 2005. As of early
2007, Britain had 191,030 regular forces and 199,280
reservists. Of the reservists, 134,180 were in the Army
(1,030 on active duty); 22,200 in the Royal Navy (720
on active duty); and 42,900 in the Royal Air Force
(360 on active duty). The TA’s authorized strength
amounts to 42,000 personnel, including a University
Officer Training Corps (UOTC) of 3,500, but recruiting
and retention problems have left it with a force of only
37,360. At present, there are also 2,100 reservists serving
in Northern Ireland.33 Although the UOTC provides
many TA officers, its 19 university-based units cannot
be mobilized except during a national emergency. The
Royal Navy sponsors 14 University Royal Navy Units
at or near university campuses. These units allow
undergraduates to gain insight into Navy careers
without any service obligation. The 15 University Air
Squadrons offer undergraduates an opportunity to fly
training aircraft for some 20-30 hours a year.
The Territorial Army has changed substantially
during the past century. When the United Kingdom
created the TA in 1907, the term “territorial” signified
that its members—who had previously been organized
into separate elements such as the Volunteers, Militia,
and Yeomanry—were not required to serve outside
British territory. With the end of conscription in
1960, however, the relationship between the TA and
the Regular Army changed dramatically. Whereas in
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World War I, World War II, and the Korean War the
TA consisted of complete combat divisions, in 1967 the
MOD introduced a “One Army” concept that integrated
the TA units directly into the Regular Army.34 The new
policy required the TA, when mobilized, to provide
“round out” units of up to battalion size to support
the active-duty Army. (The U.S. Army National Guard
adopted a similar policy after the Vietnam War.)
The One Army concept also established for the first
time a single chain of command for Regular and TA
personnel.35
In March 2006, Armed Forces Minister Adam
Ingram announced plans to enhance the TA’s
contribution to future military operations by aligning
its structure and roles more closely with those of the
regular Army. These changes will occur as part of
a broader Future Army Structure (FAS) initiative,
which aims to create new medium-sized fighting
units. Within the FAS framework, TA members will
enjoy greater opportunities to train with their Regular
counterparts, making it easier to integrate reservists
when mobilized. Under the new “pairing” concept,
each TA unit will have affiliations with two Regular
units: a primary affiliation with the unit that it would
join in operations, and a secondary affiliation with
a unit with which it will conduct routine training.
(The current “regimental” system combines one
regular battalion and one TA battalion into a British
Infantry regiment.) In addition, the TA will continue
transforming its large combat units into either combat
service support units or into individual or small-size
reinforcement components for integration directly into
regular units engaged in military operations short of
large-scale warfare. Specifically, the new TA units will
include more engineers, armored, intelligence, and
other support forces, and fewer infantry, signalers,
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logisticians, and volunteer medical troops. The
remaining TA infantry will be reorganized into 14 TA
infantry battalions that will constitute an integral part
of the Future Infantry Structure. Additional full-time
staff will become responsible for acquiring, training,
and keeping new recruits. These changes are intended
to be budget neutral. They also are scheduled to take
place over a number of years to allow TA members
time to transfer to new skills or units.36
The Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and the Royal
Marines Reserve (RMR) represent the Royal Navy’s
reserve components.37 Entrants into these groups
must be between the ages of 16 and 40 and either
British or Commonwealth citizens, or Irish Republic
nationals. They must meet the same entry standards
as those joining regular Royal Navy components.
The RNR no longer controls its own ships or has its
own operational units. Its members typically provide
additional trained personnel to the Royal Navy in
times of heightened operational commitments. They
train in support fields such as logistics, medicine,
and communications. About a quarter of RNR
members have previously served in the Royal Navy.
Opportunities exist for RNR personnel to serve with
the Royal Navy for periods of up to several years while
retaining their reserve status. Provided a mobilization
order is not in force, RNR members may resign with 1
month’s notice. In peacetime, RNR members normally
undertake a minimum of 12 days of Operational Role
Training (ORT) annually, complemented by a number
of evening drills and some weekend drills. Most new
entrants attend evening drills once a week at their
nearest RNR Unit. Specialized short-term (2 weeks or
less) training courses for RNR members are provided
by the relevant Royal Navy training schools.
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The Royal Marines Reserve (RMR), consisting of
almost 1,000 trained personnel, is a formal component
of the Royal Navy. Approximately 10 percent of
RMR members serve at any one time as long-term
volunteers in regular Royal Marines units deployed in
conflict zones such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Other RMR
members augment the Regular Marines Corps on a
short-term basis. Since RMR personnel are expected to
integrate readily with their regular counterparts, they
must pass the same challenging Commando Course,
which normally requires 8-to-10 months of training.
Volunteers may be civilians with no previous military
experience, transfers from the TA, or former activeduty Royal Marines. Like new TA members, RMR
entrants typically undergo specialist training at the
Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre opened at
Chilwell in 1999.
The Reserve Air Forces numbers slightly over 40,000
personnel. Most serve in the Royal Air Force Reserve,
providing either full or part-time service to fulfill their
obligations as former members of the Regular Royal Air
Force (RAF). The Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF)
is another fully functioning element of the RAF. The
RAuxAF is staffed by approximately 1,500 part-time,
volunteer military personnel who normally hold fulltime civilian jobs. The 20 RAuxAF units, most of which
are co-located at operational RAF stations, provide
many essential specialist and support functions. These
contributions encompass intelligence, air traffic control,
linguistics, medical services, and other noncombat
functions. The MOD called up RAuxAF units during
both the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War and the current
global war on terrorism.
In order to make the reserve components more
flexible and allow individuals greater opportunities to
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define their level of commitment, the Reserve Forces
Act of 1996 established several other categories of
reservists. These components differ both in terms
of their functions and in the levels of commitment
required by reservists. The MOD envisages taking
further steps to develop a flexible continuum of service,
including expanding opportunities to move among
the various reserve and active duty components. In its
December 2003 defense white paper, the government
affirmed: “Our strategic intent is for Reserves to be
a part-time but professional force, underpinned by a
strong volunteer ethos. . . . We aim to achieve this by
encouraging the widest possible participation through
offering as much flexibility in the types of Reserve as
possible, while meeting Defence needs.”38
The MOD provides certain reservists the
opportunity to volunteer for Full-Time Reserve Service
(FTRS) for a predetermined period in a specific billet
with the active-duty forces. Individuals volunteering
for FTRS typically fill established regular positions
during manning shortfalls. FTRS Reservists are fully
deployable, both overseas and in the United Kingdom.
FTRS has three sub-categories, which vary by
commitment. Those on Full Commitment serve worldwide in the same manner as their regular counterparts.
As an example, the Royal Navy allows its reservists
to serve with active-duty units on full-time contracts
for time periods ranging from three months to three
years.39 Those on a Limited Commitment are available
for deployment for up to 35 days annually, though they
are restricted to 21 days in any one period. Those on
Home Commitment cannot be deployed or detached
without their consent, except for essential training. The
MOD encourages employers to grant sabbatical leave
for reservists on FTRS.
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Additional Duties Commitment (ADC) Reserves are
reserve personnel who serve part-time, often on various
job-sharing arrangements, for a specified time period
in a particular post. The minimum commitment for an
ADC Reservist is at least 1 day a week of continuous
service for at least 13 weeks. Such reservists can work
in either regular or reserve units. Most individuals with
ADC status work at various military headquarters.
The category of Sponsored Reserves represents a
British innovation designed to deal with the increased
importance of private sector support workers in
sustaining military operations. Sponsored Reserves
are civilian contractors who have agreed to join the
reserves to facilitate their integration into the British
armed forces. In peacetime, they perform support
services, from providing transportation to maintaining
increasingly complex weapons systems, through
their civilian employers. During conflicts and crises,
Sponsored Reservists are liable for mobilization and
deployment in support of ongoing military operations.
The MOD now conditions the awarding of several large
contracts on the condition that a certain percentage
of a contractor’s workforce joins the reserves. Each
contract specifies the length and frequency of their
call-up commitments, as well as their conditions of
service (e.g., some continue to receive higher civilian
rates of pay). The Sponsored Reserves concept aims
both to save money (where civilian contractors replace
more expensive military personnel) and increase
deployability (by requiring civilians to accept reserve
status). In Iraq, some 1,500 Sponsored Reservists served
in uniform. They have supported the RAF’s Mobile
Meteorological Unit, the Navy’s Ro-Ro Strategic Sealift
Vessels, and the RAF Royal Squadron of transport
planes and helicopters.40 Unfortunately, the MOD has
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applied this concept in an incomplete and piecemeal
manner.41
The High Readiness Reserves category consists of
people who have specific skills that the military expects
to need urgently in a crisis, but rarely otherwise. They
agree that the MOD can mobilize them with less than
1 week’s notice and retain them on active duty status
for a maximum of 9 months. If they work more than 2
days a week in regular civilian jobs, their employers
must sign an annual agreement consenting to their
participation in the High Readiness Reserves.
In accordance with its Defence Planning
Assumptions, the British government assigns three
primary military roles to the reserve components.42
First, they augment active-duty forces during long-term
operations such as the peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone. When
combined with the demands of operations in Northern
Ireland, Afghanistan, and especially Iraq (where over
40,000 British troops were deployed at one time), these
enduring commitments have made it necessary for
many regular British soldiers to serve on back-to-back
operations with only 9 months between deployments.43
By providing an additional source of manpower,
reservists allow regular personnel time to recuperate.
The MOD tries to rely on voluntary mobilization for
such long-term operations, but can compel RF activation
if necessary. Through their participation in Joint CivilMilitary Co-operation Groups and other mechanisms,
British reservists in the Balkans and Iraq have assisted
with physical reconstruction, reviving commerce, and
promoting good relations among local parties.
Second, the Reserve Forces provide the MOD
with additional capability for large-scale military
operations. In these cases, the RF supply both
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individual reinforcements (often through “backfilling”) and entire formed units. Their main function
is to augment the force pool available for British
commanders as well as to provide a foundation for
regenerating an even larger military such as the force
Britain established during both world wars. In any
major conflict, moreover, the reservists would provide
essential specialist capabilities. The 1998 Strategic
Defence Review, while mandating that regular forces
maintain sufficient capacity to undertake early-entry
operations independently, assigned reserve and
contractor personnel a greater role in providing combat
support and combat service support units for large
short-notice missions. For example, the restructuring
enhanced the TA’s role in such areas as artillery, air
defense, and medical services while decreasing its
contingent of infantry and engineers.44 Since 2003, over
12,000 reservists have deployed on Operation Telic,
the British component of the coalition military mission
in Iraq and its surrounding areas. This mobilization
required the largest compulsory call out of Britain’s
RF since the 1956 Suez Crisis. Overall, reservists have
contributed 11-12 percent of the total British military
contingent in Iraq.45
Finally, even in smaller operations, the MOD relies
on the Reserve Forces’ specialized capabilities that the
Regular Forces find impractical to maintain in sufficient
quantity to meet all possible contingencies. Some
specialist skills and training—such as those of civilian
professionals with expertise in foreign languages,
information technologies, or other fields—are available
primarily or exclusively in the reserve components. For
instance, the Territorial Army has units consisting only
of specialists in such areas as computers, medicine, and
engineering. In Operation TELIC, the TA provided
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approximately half of the deployed medical personnel
for Britain’s field hospitals.46 They have also proved
useful in managing major civilian infrastructure projects in environments too dangerous for civilian
contractors. The MOD is developing an improved
database of reservists’ civilian skills to utilize them
better in future contingencies—though with recognition
that many reservists, especially outside the medical
profession, join the military in part as a change from
their civilian jobs.
British reservists also assumed a more prominent
role in maintaining security within the British
homeland. The MOD expects VRF personnel, who
are based at hundreds of locations across the United
Kingdom, to provide important military support
during domestic emergencies. These contingencies
include major terrorist attacks, natural disasters such
as major flooding, or disease outbreaks such as the 2001
Foot and Mouth epidemic among British livestock.47 In
particular, the government can now mobilize the 14
regional Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRFs),
which became fully operational at the end of 2003.
These units consist of approximately 500 Volunteer
Reservists drawn from all military services. Their
function is to provide, on request, Military Aid to the
Civil Authorities (MACA) after a large-scale terrorist
attack, catastrophic accident, major natural disaster, or
similar nonindustrial emergency (i.e., the authorities
cannot use the reserves to break strikes) within the
United Kingdom.
In any major incident, Regular Forces are expected
to lead the response because of their generally greater
capabilities and readiness. The CCRFs, however,
could offer rapid if temporary general support in
such areas as reconnaissance, access control, food,
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and shelter. They could also quickly make available
their command, control, and communications assets
to local responders. CCRF members have begun
training alongside their local emergency responders,
who would provide the main medical, fire, and other
more specialized assistance. The MOD’s assumption is
that, in certain cases, unarmed CCRF members could
usefully supplement both the regular forces and first
responders by drawing on their local knowledge and
contacts gained from living and working in the affected
region. To enhance reservists’ ability to respond to
domestic emergencies, the MOD now requires all VRF
members to undertake additional training in MACArelated tasks. For example, contingency planning
exercises help familiarize reservists with emergency
management procedures, organization, and services.
CCRF volunteers undertake 5 days of supplementary
training and all other VRF members undergo 2
additional days of MACA-related training.48 Since the
prospects of any particular CCRF unit being mobilized
at any one time are low, and they are not expected to
remain on duty beyond the immediate emergency,
CCRF volunteers retain their normal reservist roles
and responsibilities.49
In all these functions, British policy treats the
reserve components as an essential—and perhaps
increasingly important—link between the military
and civilian society. Whereas recent budget cuts have
led to the closure of many regular military bases,
reservists remain stationed at approximately 400
bases throughout the country. In particular, TA units
are much more widely dispersed than Regular Army
forces, making them the most visible face of the British
armed forces in many places. Their long-standing ties
with local communities also facilitate the recruitment
29

of new members to both the Reserve and Regular
Forces.50 For example, the TA directly supplies a large
percentage of recruits for the Regular Army.51 Like the
members of other reserve components, TA members
are employed in a wide variety of civilian sectors and
often hold leadership roles in local communities.
The Reserve Forces Act of 1996 makes all reservists
subject to compulsory mobilization both in national
emergencies and in support of military operations
outside the United Kingdom, including humanitarian
missions and post-conflict stabilization operations.
The MOD has a formal policy of “intelligent selection”
under which it generally first solicits volunteers for
any reserve operation before requiring compulsory
mobilization. Since the VRF has many members who
have served in active-duty status, the MOD plans on
mobilizing them first in time of war or emergency. The
Ministry intends to mobilize the Regular Reservists only
when the relevant VRF resources have been exhausted
or when the required capability does not exist within
the VRF. When mobilization becomes necessary, the
Defence Secretary issues a Call-out Order that specifies
which reserve components are mobilized and for what
purpose.52 Before the 1996 Act, the government had to
mobilize the entire VRF component. The problems the
MOD experienced with this requirement in the early
1990s convinced the British government to adopt new
legislation that permits individual call-ups.
In accordance with the transformation of Britain’s
reserve components into an operational reserve, the
United Kingdom has devoted considerable attention
to improving their training. For example, the MOD recently established a Tri-Service Reserve and Mobilisation Training Centre in Nottinghamshire dedicated
to preparing mobilized reservists for operations.
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All reservists receive some pre-deployment training
at this center or at facilities run by the individual
military services. The TA has 13 specialist units whose
members have skills of particular use to the military,
such as the Royal Logistics Corps and the Royal
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. These units recruit
throughout the country, but train centrally and with
less frequency than most TA units. Nonspecialized
units have traditionally recruited and trained locally.
In early 2004, however, it became evident that some
local recruiters had allowed new entrants to join the
TA even when they had failed to meet its medical or
physical fitness standards. Consequently, the MOD
has begun to exercise greater central supervision.53
The MOD tries to arrange for reservists to spend
at least some time training with those regular units
they would join on deployments, but such integration
has not always proved possible. In addition, surveys
show that reservists still complain that their training
needs receive lower priority than those of their regular
counterparts. Specifically, they cite less flexible training
schedules, training classes that are cancelled at the
last minute or that address a narrower range of skills
than those offered regular forces, fewer opportunities
to train with the latest military equipment, and field
commanders’ frequent lack of knowledge of the
particular training and skills reservists bring to an
operation. The MOD has taken steps to overcome
these problems. For example, it has lengthened the
average mobilization period from 9 to 11 months for
reservists deployed in Iraq to provide opportunities
for additional training.54
The MOD relies on various measures to sustain
employer support for their employees’ increasingly
burdensome reserve commitments. All new reservists
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are expected to inform their employers of their
enlistment.55 The MOD regularly solicits employer
opinions on reserve-related issues through research,
direct contact, and the National Employer Advisory
Board, which provides independent advice to the
MOD on issues regarding reserve employment.
The SaBRE (Supporting Britain’s Reservists and
Employers), a MOD-initiated program launched in
October 2002, seeks to strengthen employers’ support
for the reserve components, especially the VRF.
Through disseminating information and promoting a
consultative dialogue among employers, reservists, and
government bodies, SaBRE highlights the transferable
technical and managerial skills reservists acquire
through military service that could benefit civilian
employers. The program also offers examples of bestpractice policies and solicits the views of employers
and reservists regarding employment issues. SaBRE
staff cannot intervene directly to resolve employerreservist problems, but they can provide guidance
regarding both parties’ precise legal obligations and
details about where to obtain legal, financial, and
other assistance.56 The MOD also recently established a
network of regional Employer Support Executives that,
along with the Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations
(formerly the Territorial and Auxiliary Volunteer
Reserve Associations), work directly with civilian
employers on reserve issues.57
The Reserve Forces Act limits the time for which
any reservist may be mobilized. The law generally
allows for a maximum cumulative total of 12 months
in any 3-year period. In practice, the MOD seeks to
restrict reserve mobilizations to a maximum of 12
months every 5 years since feedback from reservists
and their employers indicate that a one-in-five year
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deployment schedule is more acceptable.58 On the
other hand, surveys indicate that reservists complain if
they lack opportunities to participate in actual military
operations when suitable opportunities arise. For this
reason, the MOD tries to keep them “simmering”
by mobilizing at least a proportion of the reserves
whenever possible.59
To make reservists’ commitments even more
tolerable to their families and employers, the MOD
aims to mobilize only those reservists who volunteer
for a deployment. In addition, during the week after
a reservist receives a call-up notice, moreover, the
MOD allows an employer to request that the planned
mobilization of an employee be delayed or cancelled
if the reservist’s absence would inflict “serious harm”
on the business or organization. Employers can also
receive financial assistance to offset any costs incurred
as a result of a call-up. These could include the costs
of advertising for a replacement, overtime pay, or the
need to hire temporary employees. In recent years, the
MOD has increased these benefits and streamlined the
application procedure required to access them.
Although the Reserve Forces Act does not specify an
obligatory notice period, the MOD intends whenever
possible to give 28 days formal advanced warning of
mobilizations. This length corresponds to the 4-week
notice employees generally give their employers when
leaving a job. The MOD also seeks to provide additional
informal early warning of possible deployment when
possible, though this increases the risk of reservists,
their families, and their employers preparing for
mobilizations that do not occur. The recently instituted
Employer Notification procedure requires new VRF
members to grant the MOD permission to contact
their employer directly, ensuring their awareness of
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their employees’ possible mobilization.60 Previously,
reservists had to report their civilian employment to
the MOD but were not obliged to inform employers of
their military status.
Furthermore, employers are not required to pay a
mobilized reservist his or her salary. The MOD pays
VRF members an annual bounty, a tax-free bonus
for fulfilling their training commitment, and a salary
for each hour of training plus any related expenses.
When they are called up for active duty service, they
receive the same salary as Regular soldiers according
to their rank. In April 2005, the MOD adopted a new
remuneration package specifically targeted at deployed
reservists. If a mobilized reservist earns more in his
or her civilian job than in the reserves, the MOD will
make up the shortfall within very generous limits.
If this salary supplement proves insufficient and the
reservist can demonstrate hardship, he or she can
apply for additional compensation. The Safeguard of
Employment Act of 1985 obligates employers to rehire
former employees who have been mobilized, provided
the employee returns to work within 6 months of his
or her demobilization. The Act requires the employer
to reinstate returning reservists on the same terms (but
not necessarily in the same position) as they would
have enjoyed if they had not been mobilized. British
law also prohibits employers from dismissing an
employee solely or mainly because of that individual’s
reserve status.
The increasingly generous benefits provided
to British reservists have left the MOD uncertain
regarding the actual costs of its reserve components. A
complicating factor is that many defense expenditures
apply to the British armed forces as a whole and cannot
easily be disaggregated into expenses for particular
regular and reserve components. Even more difficult to
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assess are the relative marginal costs of using a regular
soldier or a reservist for any particular task.
Since 2003, the war in Iraq has had the same negative
effects on Britain’s reserve components as it has on
those of the United States. Although many reservists
express satisfaction with their opportunity to serve
their country by participating in actual deployments, all
Britain’s VRF components are below their authorized
strength and suffer from higher turnover than desired.
Despite a costly advertising campaign and extra
compensation for reservists called up to active duty,
the Territorial Army in particular has suffered major
recruitment, retention, and readiness problems. In
2005, the TA had only 35,000 soldiers—its smallest size
since its creation in 1907 and well below its authorized
size of 42,000. According to press accounts, in practice
only 24,000 of these troops have been fully trained, of
which at most 12,000 are available for deployment to
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. Since the beginning
of the Iraq war in March 2003, the rate of exodus from
the TA has more than quadrupled, to some 6,000
for the 1-year period ending in September 2005. A
vicious circle has set in, with the TA’s shrinking size
reinforcing warnings about “overstretch,” further
weakening the appeal of reserve duty.61 These concerns
about overstretch appear warranted. Although the
MOD intends for the TA to provide only 10 percent of
the personnel deployed on overseas missions, in 2004
reservists comprised almost a quarter of the British
military contingent in Iraq.62 Altogether, about a third
of current TA personnel have already served tours in
the Middle East or Afghanistan.63 According to the
provisions of the 1996 Reserve Forces Act, the MOD
cannot legally require them to serve again for another
3 years. Given that the Iraq war resulted in the first
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compulsory call-up of reservists from all three services
since the Korean War, officials fear that other reserve
components besides the TA could suffer similar
mobilization problems.
The MOD is still evaluating how best to structure
and use Britain’s reserve components to manage
contemporary security challenges. It has launched
a major study of possible further reconfigurations in
the TA—”Future Army Structure: Territorial Army,”
scheduled for completion in 2012—as part of a larger
assessment about how to optimize the British military
for 21st-century security requirements. A major
challenge consists in strengthening the integration of
reserve and regular personnel while still providing
opportunities for those who want to limit their military
commitments. Demographic problems common to
many countries (e.g., a smaller number of young
people fit for military service) also worry defense
planners. Although the Ministry of Defence would
like to restrict the use of most reservists to only largescale operations, Britain’s extensive overseas security
commitments and personnel shortages in key skills
could require the continued use of many reservists for
smaller-scale operations. MOD officials hope that their
recent changes in reserve structures and policies will
help resolve this problem. In the end, however, the
next British government, like many of its 20th-century
predecessors, might consider more radical solutions
to re-balance the country’s ambitious foreign policy
objectives with its limited military capabilities.
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CHAPTER 4
FRANCE
The end of the Cold War and the increased
prominence of new international security threats
have resulted in a major restructuring of the French
armed forces. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact
eliminated France’s need for a large standing army
consisting primarily of short-term conscripts. The
growing importance of peace-and-stability operations
and antiterrorism missions has increased the
requirement for more professional soldiers available
to serve on long overseas deployments. In response to
these changed conditions, the French government has
substantially reduced the size of its active-duty forces.
More importantly, in 1996 President Jacques Chirac
decided to end conscription, a long-standing bulwark
of French defense policy dating back to the French
Revolution. In October 1997, the French legislature
adopted a Law on National Service Reform (No. 971019) that suspended conscription for the indefinite
future. The last French Army conscript ended active
duty in November 2001.64
The formation of France’s new all-volunteer
professional armed forces has required an equally
far-reaching transformation of the country’s military
reserve system. At the height of the Cold War in 1984,
France’s military reserve pool exceeded four million
men. In case of a war with the Warsaw Pact, French
planners expected to call up half a million reservists.65
After mobilization, reservists would have comprised
almost half of the Army and over one-third of the Air
Force.66
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In October 1999, the French government adopted
law No. 99-894, the fundamental purpose of which
was to transform the French reserve components from
a “réserve de masse” (mass mobilization reserve) to a
“réserve d’emploi” (deployment reserve). As part of this
effort to convert the reserves from a large manpower
pool to a smaller but better integrated operational
component of the French military, the legislation
created two separate reserve components: la réserve
opérationnelle (the Operational Reserve) and la réserve
citoyenne (the Citizens’ Reserve).67 Reservists in both
components must be French citizens, physically fit,
have no criminal record, and be at least 17 years old.
(A 2006 law lowered the age limit from 18 years.) All
reserve positions are open to women. The maximum
age of entry into the reserves for individuals lacking
military experience is 30 years. Former regular soldiers
can enter later, with the maximum age varying
according to their past rank. Reservists normally end
their term of service when they reach the age of 40
years (for enlisted personnel) or 50 years (for officers
and noncommissioned officers).68
The réserve opérationnelle is designed primarily to
provide trained reinforcements for the active-duty
forces. Its members consist of both former active-duty
military personnel and volunteers. Upon discharge
from active service, all French military personnel are
required to serve an additional 5 years in the réserve
opérationnelle. Volunteers can serve from 1 to 5 years,
depending on the terms of their contrat d’engagement
à servir dans la réserve (ESR). This renewable contract
also specifies the voluntary reservist’s military field
and specialization. Periodic reserve training typically
amounts to 20-30 days per year, up to 120 in case of
overseas operations. Units in the réserve opérationnelle
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can be used both in France and abroad, in war or
peacetime. Units of the réserve opérationnelle are expected
to “bring a quick response to operational needs. One
third of the reservists will be ready for use within 4-15
days.69 During a crisis, their duties include providing
general reinforcement, aiding the population, and
maintaining continuity of essential public services. In
times of “extreme emergency,” the government can
also use reservists for internal and border security,
including protecting public facilities.
With the creation of the réserve opérationnelle, the
French government is moving toward the same “total
force” concept embraced by the United States and many
other Western powers. In the past, reservists formed
a separate branch of the French military.70 Today,
members of the réserve opérationnelle join a specific
military branch (Army, Navy, gendarmerie) as indicated
in their ESR contract. They are also able to serve in the
same missions as regular military personnel, though
typically for a shorter time period. They can participate
either as individual members of an active-duty unit or—
less commonly, especially on overseas missions—as a
collective military unit consisting only of operational
reservists. While on active duty, reservists enjoy the
same status and financial compensation as regular
personnel of comparable rank and grade. French
defense officials anticipate that better integration of the
réserve opérationnelle into the active-duty military will
improve its readiness, interoperability, and usability.71
Law No. 99-894 describes the main purposes of
the réserve citoyenne as maintaining a link between
the French nation and its armed forces as well as
providing “l’ésprit de défense” (“the spirit of defense”)
to the French people.72 In effect, this new reserve
component represents an effort to sustain the sense of
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national solidarity that many believe existed during
the era of compulsory military service. The réserve
citoyenne includes three groups. The first category
comprises former military personnel who did not
receive a summons to join the réserve opérationnelle. The
second group consists of former members of the réserve
opérationnelle who have finished their service obligation
but wish to remain a formal part of the French armed
forces. Civilian volunteers constitute the third element
of the réserve citoyenne.
The different reserve categories share many
duties, including assisting with recruiting, facilitating
communications between the public and the armed
forces, reinforcing emergency response mechanisms,
and organizing ceremonies designed to mark important
military events. Originally, Law No. 99-894 allowed
the armed forces to integrate members of the réserve
citoyenne into the réserve opérationnelle in times of war
or crisis. In April 2006, however, a modification to the
legislation restricted the use of the réserve citoyenne to
“nonmilitary tasks” only.73 At present, the military
neither assigns these reservists to a specific post nor
provides them with formal military training, military
uniforms, or regular stipends. The government still
hopes, however, that the réserve citoyenne will provide
a pool of potential volunteers for entry (or in some
cases re-entry) into the réserve opérationnelle. French law
makes such transfers fairly routine. In their activities,
the members of the réserve citoyenne fulfill some of
the representational and public education functions
performed by the U.S. National Guard, while lacking
its combat and combat support responsibilities.
A 2002 report issued by the National Assembly, the
lower house of the French legislature, found that almost
all reservists had previously served in the active-duty
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military.74 These findings evoked concern since, with
the suspension of national service, the number of
former conscripts would decline over time. As a result
of this study, the French government took steps to
increase the number of voluntary enlisted members,
including allocating more funds for their recruitment.
At the end of 2004, France had 43,614 volunteers in the
réserve opérationnelle, only a slight shortfall from the
desired target of 44,270.75 Current force goals envisage
reaching 94,000 volunteers by 2012: 29,000 for the
army, 7,700 for the navy, 8,250 for the air force, 40,000
for the gendarmerie, 8,600 for the medical corps, and
500 for the energy corps.76 By 2015, French officials
hope to have 100,000 reservists, with half of them in
the gendarmerie.77 Although the French government
had initially sought to create an all-volunteer military
reserve force, the April 2006 legislation acknowledged
the value of retaining former active-duty personnel
in the réserve opérationnelle because of their superior
training and availability.78
That approximately 50 percent of all French
reservists will serve in the gendarmerie testifies to
its increased importance in defending the French
homeland. In 2000, the gendarmerie accounted for only
27 percent of the Reserve.79 Although this paramilitary
force falls under the authority of the Ministry of the
Interior in peacetime, it works closely with the Army
command, enjoys high interoperability with Army
units, and is funded through the defense budget as
“an integral part of the armed forces.” In wartime,
the gendarmerie reports to the armed forces command,
doubles in size, and fulfills priority homeland defense
and security missions.80 The gendarmerie has sufficient
armored vehicles, helicopters, and crew-serviced
weapons to respond to large-scale terrorist incidents or
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to reinforce regular military forces in an emergency. It
has two main components as well as several specialized
units. One particularly important specialized unit is the
groupement de securité et d’intervention de la gendarmerie
nationale, which has unique capabilities for countering
WMD terrorism involving chemical, biological, and
nuclear/radiological agents.
The gendarmerie has two main components, the
gendarmerie départementale and the gendarmerie mobile.
The gendarmerie départementale provides the main
police force outside major metropolitan areas, where
the police nationale has primary jurisdiction. In the
remaining 95 percent of French territory, the gendarmerie
départementale helps regulate traffic, investigate
crimes, track down suspects, and maintain aviation
and port security. In frontier regions, the gendarmerie
départementale also assists with border control and the
enforcement of French immigration laws.
The other component, the gendarmerie mobile, has
the lead role in combating terrorism within France. It
gathers intelligence about possible terrorist attacks,
promotes public safety, and protects the country’s
critical civilian infrastructure (including airports,
dams, the Paris Metro, foreign embassies, national
monuments, and both France’s civilian nuclear
plants and its nuclear weapons).81 The reserves in the
gendarmerie have less legal authority than their regular
counterparts. For example, they can use their weapons
only in “cases of legitimate defense.”82 Despite this
restriction, gendarmerie mobile reserves played a major
security role during the 2003 G-8 summit at Évian. (The
Army reserves also participate actively in homeland
security endeavors—providing security at special
events and helping manage natural disasters such as
storms, floods, and forest fires.83)
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The gendarmerie is involved in all overseas
deployments by virtue of its traditional military police
duties. Its specialized units also assist with peace
operations, intelligence gathering, and other foreign
missions. Article 8 of Law No. 99-894 also permits the
use of members of the réserve opérationnelle on operations
extérieures (“external operations,” or OPEX) outside
French territory. From the point of view of the United
States and France’s other potential military allies, this
policy change represents a major improvement. The
French law banning the use of conscripts in foreign
combat zones considerably limited France’s ability to
contribute to the 1990-91 DESERT STORM campaign.
In the past, France has had to rely on the French
Foreign Legion and other units consisting solely of fulltime soldiers for operations outside French territory.
Although French conscripts did participate in the
1954-62 war in Algeria, their use provoked widespread
controversy despite Algeria’s formal legal status as a
part of France.84 The difficulty associated with using
conscripts on foreign operations contributed to the
decision to end conscription and to transform the
military into an entirely professional force capable of
responding to international contingencies as well as
direct threats to French territory.85
Most French reservists who deploy overseas
possess special skills (e.g., linguists, jurists, and
engineers). Article 9 of law No. 99-894 allows for such
specialists to enter the reserves without prior military
training. They often work in civil affairs (actions civilomilitaires), a particularly important function in the
post-conflict stability operations that increasingly
preoccupy Western militaries.86 Although French
military planners seek to take advantage of the skills
reservists gain through their civilian employment, they
43

recognize that many reservists join the armed forces
to do something different from their regular jobs. To
encourage more volunteers, French authorities do not
require reservists to use their civilian skills in their
military assignments.
In practice, however, the participation of French
reservists in foreign operations has remained limited.
In 2002, only some 350 reservists were engaged in
overseas military missions.87 In 2003, OPEX constituted
merely 3.94 percent of all reserve activities. The
corresponding figure for 2004 was 3.92 percent.88 French
legislation indicates that the main function of reservists
is to enhance security within France and substitute for
active-duty units deployed abroad. For example, the
2003-08 military program law states that the reserves
“will have to fulfill missions at home, as a complement
or substitute for operational personnel occupied
elsewhere, and thus constitute a pool at the disposal
of the government according to arrangements defined
in an inter-ministerial framework, for the support of
civilian/military operations as well as protection and
security operations at home.”89
In 2004, approximately 1,000 French Army
Reservists served on such opérations intérieures
(“internal operations,” or OPINT).90 These included
both homeland defense missions under Plan Vigipirate
and responses to forest fires and other natural disasters
under Plan Hephaistos. The Vigipirate civil defense
plan is a unique French creation. Under its provisions,
which have remained in force since the start of
Operation DESERT STORM in January 1991, the police,
gendarmerie, and other branches of the French armed
forces conduct joint domestic operations to ensure the
protection of the country’s critical infrastructure. These
security forces increase their patrols, reinforce border
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crossings, and enhance their protection of the country’s
schools, public buildings, and other sites vulnerable to
terrorist attacks.91
In the past, restrictions on the allowable duration
of reserve mobilizations have also discouraged their
overseas use. Until recently, the maximum amount of
time that a reservist could serve on active duty was
only 120 days. Reservists also had to obtain employer
approval 2 months in advance of deployment. As
a result, the Ministry of Defense found it difficult to
dispatch reservists overseas for sufficiently long periods
to make their deployment worthwhile. To allow for
greater use of reserve forces in foreign engagements,
the French legislature in April 2006 amended law
No. 99-894 to extend the permissible mobilization
period to 210 days in case of war or emergency. It also
reduced the required time for advanced notice in such
circumstances to 1 month.
While the French military has met its goal for
recruiting reserve officers, its recruitment of reserve
enlisted personnel has lagged, probably due to the
priority given to manning the new all-volunteer activeduty force. To achieve the 2008 objective of 68,000
reservists under ESR, a 6,000 per year increase of the
enlisting will be necessary. Thus far, the 2008 target
objective has been fulfilled at 73 percent and 47 percent
for officers and non-commissioned officers, but only at
23 percent for ordinary non-officers, even if the number
of rank and file reserve recruits has increased 44 percent
since 2002.92 Before 2003, officers made up 60 percent
of the reserves, noncomissioned officers (NCOs) about
30 percent, and enlisted members only 10 percent. The
government would like to have 25 percent officers,
30 percent NCOs, and 45 percent enlisted men by
2008.93 In order to facilitate the recruitment of enlisted
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personnel into the reserves, the French government
has increased the signing bonus for volunteer recruits.
Any reserve recruit that registers to become an enlisted
soldier between 2003 and 2008 will receive a 1,000 euro
bonus.94 This measure and related initiatives helped
increase the number of enlisted soldiers in the French
reserves by 24.73 percent in 2004.95
To increase the overall number of reservists,
especially volunteers, the French government has
revised other recruiting techniques. For example,
French authorities began requiring all French youth—
males since 1998; females since 2000—to participate
in a journée d’appel de préparations à la défense (JAPD, a
“day of introduction to military service”). The JAPD
obligates all French citizens between the ages of 16
and 18 to spend a day at a nearby public facility (often
a military base) at the government’s expense. Upon
arrival, they learn from regular and reserve soldiers
about the French defense establishment, including
opportunities to serve in the military. Only those who
complete the program receive a certificat individuel
de participation, which is required to register for the
national examinations administered by public entities
(e.g., to enter a public institution of higher education
or to obtain a government job). Participation in JAPD
is also required for entry into the reserves or other
components of the French armed forces. Another
measure intended to increase awareness of the reserves
was the institution (in Article 55 of Law No. 99-894) of
a journée nationale du réserviste. On this day, the national
government sponsors nationwide ceremonies paying
tribute to France’s reservists and highlighting their
contributions to French security and society.96 Other
reserve recruiting efforts include targeted information
campaigns at universities, academic gatherings,
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and professional meetings (e.g., among medical
specialists).97
France is having the same difficulty as other countries
in securing employer support for the increased use of
reservists. Employers complain about absent workers
and lower profits, arguing that France’s reserve policy
weakens national firms against foreign competitors.
Although law No. 99-894 permits reservists to serve for
up to 30 days annually, it only requires their employers
to grant them 5 days of military-related leave per year.
Reservists need their employers’ specific approval,
negotiated at least 1 month before their service begins,
to miss any additional work days. Reservists typically
must devote many weekends and holidays to fulfill
their reserve commitments.
Growing employer discontent led the government
to create a Conseil Supérieur de la Réserve Militaire
(CSRM) in October 2000 to provide a forum for elite
discussion concerning the reserve components. Its
62 members include members of parliament, armed
forces personnel, major employers, and representatives
of various reserve associations. The CSRM is charged
with promoting reform of the reserve components
and helping maintain good relations among civilian
employers, the armed services, and the government.
The CSRM is also responsible for sustaining the “ésprit
de défense” in France. To this end, the CSRM produces
an annual report analyzing how the implementation of
different laws affects the reserve components. Recent
CSRM projects have included creating a database of
competencies within the reserves and establishing
conventions that give reservists more benefits than
guaranteed by law (such as more compensation and
shorter employer notification requirements).98 Survey
data show that employers generally appreciate that
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reservists bring valuable skills acquired on duty to their
workplace. On balance, they believe that reservists
have a positive effect on their business.99 In an effort
to increase this support, the government in December
2005 passed a law providing a tax credit to employers
of up to 200 euros per reservist, or 30,000 euros in total,
to help compensate for the financial costs of employing
reservists.100 Thanks to the creation of the CSRM and
these other initiatives, French authorities have made
some progress in achieving improved relations among
employers, reservists, and the state.101
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CHAPTER 5
GERMANY
Unlike most other North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries, Germany stubbornly
adheres to a policy of military conscription. At present,
the Compulsory Military Service Act subjects all male
German citizens to conscription into the German
armed forces (the Bundeswehr) when they reach the
age of 18. The typical duration of conscription is 9
months, but conscripts can subsequently volunteer for
several additional (typically, 2-13) months of service.
As a result, the Bundeswehr contains both career forces
(mostly officers, NCOs, and specialists) and Zeitsoldaten
(soldiers who serve for limited periods before returning
to civilian life). Zeitsoldaten encompass soldiers
performing their basic military service as required
by law, those who have voluntarily extended their
initial tour, and members of the Bundeswehr’s reserve
components.
Many German military and civilian leaders believe
that conscription fulfills an essential function in keeping
the armed forces firmly connected to the general
population and, since 1990, in helping to integrate
former East German citizens. In this regard, they stress
that one of the roles of the reserves is to represent the
military to society. For example, the German Ministry
of Defense’s most authoritative publication on the
country’s reserve components states: “Reservists are
mediators between the Bundeswehr and the civilian
sector of society. They contribute to sustaining
motivation for military service and help people to see
security issues in a wider context.”102 Partly because
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of Germany’s complex history, the country’s leaders
repeatedly emphasize the importance of the country’s
reserve components as “citizens in uniform.”
Opponents of conscription see compulsory military
service as an unnecessary infringement on civil
liberties now that the Cold War has ended. In addition,
the large number of draft exemptions generates
complaints that the arbitrary burden of military
service falls disproprotionately on certain strata of
German society, violating the constitutional principle
of Wehrgerechtigkeit (justice in military service). Critics
also cite pragmatic considerations against compulsory
military service. In particular, they maintain that
conscription wastes defense resources in training and
equipping large numbers of short-term soldiers that
are unlikely to be used in a conflict—and will perform
poorly if they are forced to do so.103
A major factor sustaining conscription is that
its elimination would deprive the public sector of
the extraordinarily large number of individuals
who perform low-paid community services as an
alternative to military service (the Zivildienst). Each
year over 100,000 Germans, approximately half the
total number of draftees, choose to work for 10 months
in retirement homes, community service organizations,
and international development projects. The ease with
which potential conscripts can declare themselves
conscientious objectors has effectively transformed
Germany’s system of universal conscription into one
of universal public service, at least for young men. A
further factor sustaining conscription is the fear that
ending it could hurt military recruiting—already
threatened by declining birth rates. The Bundeswehr
regularly recruits about one-half of its career personnel
from its conscripts. Finally, some Germans, concerned
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about the increased participation of German military
units in foreign operations, have offered a version of the
Abrams doctrine. Since the Bundeswehr consists largely
of conscripts rather than professional soldiers, they
expect that politicians will avoid using it excessively
or without democratic consent.
The German government considers anyone who
has ever served in the military, either through universal
service or by volunteering, as a reservist. In peacetime,
former servicemen are liable for military service as
reservists after a 12-month waiting period (Schutzfrist)
following their discharge from active duty. They remain
subject to call up until they reach the age of 60 years for
officers, 45 for NCOs, and 32 for regular soldiers (60
years in the case of emergency). Regular soldiers who
have to leave active duty because they have reached
the maximum retirement age can be recalled until the
age of 65. The time requirements for female personnel
are shorter.
At present, Germany has 245,702 active-duty
troops: 160,794 in the Army, 24,328 in the Navy, and
60,580 in the Air Force. The reserve components
consist of 144,548 soldiers, 3,304 sailors, and 13,960 Air
Force personnel—for a total of 161,812 reservists.104
The German government conducted an extensive
defense policy review in 2003. The resulting Defense
Policy Guidelines stressed the need to restructure the
Bundeswehr into a more agile force focused on multilateral conflict prevention and crisis management operations rather than on defending against a conventional
attack.105 The most recent German government plans,
adopted in January 2004, envisage a Bundeswehr with
approximately 252,500 active-duty troops by 2010.106
This force will consist of 35,000 front-line troops, suitable
for high-intensity operations; 70,000 “stabilization”
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soldiers intended for humanitarian and post-conflict
reconstruction missions; and 147,500 support troops,
39,000 of whom will undergo civilian vocational
training at any one time. The Bundeswehr planned for
2010 will also contain some 55,000 conscripts, as well
as approximately 80,000 reservists, integrated with the
active-duty troops.107 There will also be 2,500 reserve
duty training slots.108
The government can call up most reservists for
15 days of training per year. Reservists with special
military-relevant skills tend to be called up most
frequently, while reservists with unneeded skills may
never be recalled to active duty. The limited time
available for reserve training requires most reservists
to acquire their skills elsewhere—either during
their terms of active service or from their civilian
employment. The system emphasizes individual
training and command post exercises, especially for
reserve officers and NCOs. Officers are normally liable
for periodic training call-ups for a 10-year period,
NCOs for 7 years, and all other enlisted personnel for 4
years. People with valuable skills not widely available
in the military may be subject to periodic call-ups for
longer periods. The German defense budget includes
specific reserve training slots to pay for these call-ups.
Each slot equates to 365 duty days. For example, the
1993 budget authorized 4,000 reserve training slots.
This allocation paid for an average of 4,000 reservists
on active duty at any one time that year, or over 100,000
individual call-ups. At the height of the Cold War in
the early 1980s, the budget authorized 35,000 slots.109 In
Fiscal Year 2004, the German government allotted 2,200
reserve training slots, which funded 805,200 individual
training days (including reservists participating in
missions abroad).110 The number of training days
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required of reservists in peacetime depends on their
career category. Reserve officers typically have the
highest requirement, whereas enlisted personnel have
the lowest. Although the Bundeswehr affirms its right to
mobilize any reservist in an emergency, it seeks to use
only volunteers for most operations.111
German military doctrine assigns several important
roles to the country’s reservists. First, they allow the
Bundeswehr to reconstitute a large force if Germany
were again threatened by a conventional attack. For
example, reservists would provide the bulk of the
officers and soldiers for the army’s large number
of “semi and nonactive units.” These formations,
maintained at low readiness in peacetime, have as their
primary mission both national and collective defense
(e.g., of Germany’s NATO allies).
Second, the German government expects that
some reservists will volunteer to help manage
the consequences of domestic and international
emergencies, including natural disasters.112 In this
regard, the German government has recently expanded
the responsibilities of its reserve components in
meeting terrorist and other homeland security threats
to Germany’s population and critical infrastructure.
According to current doctrine, “Although this is first
and foremost a task to be filled by internal-security
forces, the armed forces will be available to act, within
the scope of the law in force, whenever they alone
possess the capabilities needed or when the protection
of the citizens and of critical infrastructure can only be
provided by the Bundeswehr.”113
Finally, reservists can both backfill for active-duty
forces deployed in foreign missions and participate
directly in foreign operations if necessary. During the
past decade, German military forces have been involved
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in several foreign operations. In July 1994, the Federal
Constitutional Court ruled that the German Armed
Forces could participate in multinational military
operations within a United Nations (UN) framework.
The Bundeswehr subsequently sent substantial armed
contingents to the Balkans. In August 2003, Germany
assumed command of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In the summer
of 2006, 780 German soldiers participated in the
2,000-man European Union Force (EUFOR) for the
Democratic Republic of Congo, which reinforced the
17,000-strong UN peacekeeping force supervising the
country’s national elections. This deployment marked
the first time German peacekeepers have taken part in
a UN operation in Africa.
Besides participating in peacekeeping operations,
Germany’s membership in NATO might require using
military force to defend another alliance member—a
scenario that arose in 1990 and 2003 with the possibility
of an Iraqi attack on Turkey as well as after the 9/11
terrorist attacks, when NATO invoked its Article 5
commitment to defend the United States. Germany’s
international commitments might require sending
reservists abroad to augment active-duty forces. The
Ministry of Defense recognizes that reservists can
bring linguistic skills, overseas experience, and other
valuable qualifications to foreign operations.
Germany has three categories of reservists.114 The
Reinforcement Reserve (Verstärkungsreserve) consists
primarily of volunteers for general assignments.
The Manpower Reserve (Personalreserve), which
encompasses most specialists, consists entirely of
volunteers who fill specific short-term vacancies and
other temporary assignments. The General Reserve
(Allgemeine Reserve) includes all “nonassigned
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reservists” who are subject to mobilization in a national
emergency. They provide a general manpower pool,
with no predesignated mobilization positions. Some
reserve personnel are also defined as “deployment
reservists.” In return for extra compensation during
peacetime, they maintain a high readiness level by
performing special exercises and at least 72 days of
military service within a 3-year period. These measures
aim to enable them rapidly to reinforce active-duty
forces, including for homeland defense and foreign
missions.
Reservists are placed in a category as soon as
they have completed their active-duty service. They
are assigned according to the same standards used
for active forces. Their civilian qualifications and
experience are also considered. In principle, Germany
uses the same criteria to select and train its regular
and reserve components. These troops train together
whenever possible to facilitate their integration.
Reservists with homeland security tasks coordinate
their training and exercises with German civilian
agencies having similar responsibilities. The military
uses reservists to supplement and assist the regular
forces on whatever scale is needed—from employing
single reservists to integrating whole reserve units.
At present, the Bundeswehr does not plan to mobilize
complete reserve units except on rare occasions.115
Currently, the Bundeswehr is attempting to make the
recruitment, mobilization, and use of reservists easier
and more effective. The Bundeswehr Reservist Concept
observes, “A modern personnel management tailored
to the individual will have an immediate effect on
the reservists’ willingness to perform military service
prompted especially by long-term planning, taking
personnel and professional matters into consideration,
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a modern training programme, attractive career
opportunities and timely publication of information.”116
The German military works closely with the private
sector to gain access to reservists with useful civilian
skills and qualifications. German planners recognize
that reservists can provide advanced skills and
specializations more widely available in the civilian
economy than in the armed services.
The Ministry of Defense also sponsors many events
and initiatives to integrate the reservists into the regular
armed forces. The Ministry’s Dezernat Reservistenarbeit
(Department of Reservist Work) assists active-duty
soldiers who volunteer to continue as reservists after
their term of service ends. The department formally
functions as a mediator between the Bundeswehr
and society. It manages a discussion forum among
Zeitsoldaten and offers academic courses on subjects
considered useful to the military or German society.
The semi-official Bundeswehr Reservist Association
serves as an umbrella organization for all interested
active and former reservists. Funded by the federal
government, the Association has offices staffed by fulltime employees throughout Germany. It encourages
voluntary reservist work outside the Bundeswehr,
thereby promoting integration of reservists into
civilian society.117 Participation in Association activities
provides reservists with additional opportunities to
serve beyond the limited number of active duty billets
available to reservists.118
In compensation for their service, reservists are
paid for the time they spend in training and receive
free meals, accommodations, equipment, medical
treatment, and other benefits. In accordance with
the Conscripts and Dependence Maintenance Act,
reservists employed in the private sector receive
56

compensation for salary and other income lost due to
their reserve training and other duties associated with
their military service. In addition, the Job Reservation
Act requires employers to hold reservists’ jobs for
them, with all responsibilities and benefits, while they
serve on active duty. Public sector employees typically
continue to receive their salaries when on reserve
training. Reservists also receive pension insurance,
medical care, and unemployment insurance without
charge from the Bundeswehr. Officers are reimbursed
for outside costs related to their military duties.119
Although these benefits are generous, Germany’s
limited defense spending impedes the Bundeswehr’s
ability to attract and keep voluntary reserve and regular
personnel. The country spends approximately 1.4
percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense,
one of the lowest levels in NATO. Demographic trends,
especially the overall aging of the German population
and the declining number of births, suggest the current
challenging situation will only worsen. Unless the
German government is willing to spend considerably
more on military affairs and public service functions
performed by conscientious objectors, the country is
likely to continue to rely on conscription.
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CHAPTER 6
CANADA
The Canadian Forces (CF) consist of two components: the Regular Force and the Reserve Force. The Canadian Reserve Force itself has four main components:
the Primary Reserve (P Res), the Supplementary
Reserve (Sup Res), the Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC),
and the Canadian Rangers. Canadian reservists serve
on a voluntary basis for an indefinite period. Although
most combat and service support occupations exist
in both the Regular and Reserve forces, the Canadian
Department of Defence recently created reservespecific classifications in order to take better advantage
of reservists’ civilian professional qualifications and
experience.120
The government considers the P Res the preferred
reserve component for most operations. It has
contributed approximately 10 percent of the Canadian
forces involved in recent foreign military operations.121
Its members have responsibility for certain active-duty
tasks not assigned to the Regular Forces. The P Res
is further split into Service components.122 The Army
Reserve, called the Militia, is by far the largest of the
P Res components. With 15,500 soldiers, the Militia
serves several vital functions. Most importantly, it
provides the Regular Army with the resources needed
to augment the active-duty forces in an emergency and
helps “connect” the Army with Canadian civilians. The
Naval Reserve, commanded by the Chief of Maritime
Staff, provides the crew for 10 of the Navy’s 12 maritime
coastal patrol vessels and performs coastal operations
not assigned to the active-duty Navy. Such operations
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include port security, mine countermeasures, and
intelligence functions relating to the Navy’s control
of shipping. In 2005-06, the total strength of the Naval
Reserves stood at 4,000. The government intends to
increase that number to 5,130 by 2015.
Unlike the previous two P Res components, the
Air Reserve is fully integrated into the active-duty
Air Force. There is no specific unit-level breakdown
for the 2,600 strong Air Reserves. This integration
is crucial because the regular Air Force has found it
difficult to cope with the high operational demands
of recent years. The Air Reserve provides more than a
third of Air Force personnel assigned to “incremental”
tasks. It also supplies 10 percent of Air Force personnel
deployed on overseas operations. The Air Force has
a formal policy of facilitating transfers between its
Reserve and Regular components. In recent years, it
has adopted measures to harmonize career policies
that previously restricted movement between them.123
The remaining components of the P Res force are
the Communication Reserve, the Health Services
Reserve, and the Legal Reserve. The formation of the
Communication Reserve Information Protection Team
(CRIPT) has strengthened the role of reservists in this
area. CRIPT aims to enhance Reserve support for the
Canadian Forces Information Operations Group by
providing information-protection services. The Health
Services Reserve trains its 1,200 personnel to support
and sustain CF Health Services Group Elements in
operations. Its members also provide health services
support to their assigned Canadian Brigade group
and contribute to the Health Services Primary Reserve
List. Members on the List engage in a variety of roles
ranging from supporting clinics in Canada to deploying
overseas. Finally, the Legal Reserve consists of qualified
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part-time lawyers serving in the military. Their careers
closely resemble those of their regular counterparts.124
The second of the four components of the Reserve
Forces is the Supplementary Reserve, which serves as
a list of some 40,000 former CF members whom the
government can easily recall to active duty. Members
of the Sup Res can volunteer for limited duration
full-time service in support of a specific operation.
In this case, the member would be assigned to either
the Regular Forces or the P Res, in effect upgrading
his or her Reserve role. Sup Res forces are required
to train and perform their duties only when they are
activated.125
A third component of the Reserve forces is the
Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC). It supervises and trains
the federally-sponsored Cadet program for teenagers
between the ages of 12 and 18. This program seeks to
develop “good citizenship and leadership, promoting
physical fitness, and stimulating the interest of youth
in the sea, land and air activities of the Canadian
Forces.”126 In effect, CIC officers have responsibility
for helping recruit and train the future generation of
Canada’s military forces.
The Canadian Rangers represent the final reserve
component. Their main responsibility is to provide
a military presence in Canada’s sparsely settled and
isolated northern and coastal areas. Their role is
important in regions that cannot be covered by other
CF elements due to financial or logistical limitations.
They also serve as first responders in remote regions
stricken by natural disasters. The Rangers currently
have approximately 4,000 members organized into
over 100 patrol units. The government aims to have
4,800 Rangers by March 2008.127
Besides distinguishing among the four components,
Canadian authorities categorize military reserve
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service according to three broad classes. A reservist’s
class of service determines the individual’s rate of pay
and whether his other employment is full- or parttime. Reservists may participate in more than one class
of service at various times throughout their military
careers. Class “A” service is similar to casual or parttime work. It requires a commitment of at least 4
evenings and 1 weekend per month between September
and May each year. Reservists in this class are paid a
full-day rate for periods of more than 6 working hours.
If they work less than that, they are paid a half-day
rate. Training cannot exceed more than 12 consecutive
days for Class A reservists. Their benefit package is
comprehensive, but not as generous as those provided
to the CF. Class “B” reservists sign an agreement to
train and work for a time period of anywhere between
14 and 365 consecutive days. They are paid at normal
Reserve rates. Their benefit package is similar to that
of Class A reserves if they serve less than 180 days,
while those with more than 180 days service receive
additional benefits. Class “C” reservists are those who
work in the Regular Forces for a period greater than 90
days. These reservists are governed by Regular Force
terms of service and hence receive Regular Force pay
and benefits. Class C service is only offered to reservists
on specific operations.128
Reservists normally serve on a part-time basis,
though they can volunteer for limited-duration fulltime employment in the CF. Canada’s Privy Council
last issued a mandatory call-up of the Reserve Forces
in 1939 following the onset of World War II. The Vice
Chief of the Defence Staff’s Force Structure Guidance,
published in 2000, further outlines how the Reserve
Force will expand in the event of full-scale mobilization.
The reservists also contribute to meeting Canadian
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defense needs in cases short of major wars. According
to a 1994 Defence White Paper, “the Reserves are a
national institution and provide a vital link between
the Canadian Forces and local communities. Their
primary role will be the augmentation, sustainment,
and support of deployed forces.”129
In recent years, the Department of Defence has
enhanced the role of reservists in managing domestic
emergencies. The government has repeatedly
mobilized reservists for these purposes. In 1998, for
instance, reservists helped localities recover from a
devastating ice storm and assisted the authorities with
the Swiss Air Flight 111 recovery operation. Canada
also placed thousands of reservists on-call to manage
anticipated disruptions from the Y-2K computer date
rollover during the millennial transition. The Canadian
Rangers regularly assist remote communities to recover
from disasters such as plane crashes and avalanches.
The 9/11 attacks and other terrorist incidents in North
America have led the government to enhance the role
of the reserve components in averting and responding
to terrorist attacks on Canadian territory.
In accordance with a recommendation of a 1987
White Paper, Canada adopted a “Total Force” principle
to govern the integration of its active and reserve
components. Under this policy, Canada’s reservists
formally became an “integral part of Canada’s defence
structure on an equal footing with the Regular Forces.”130
As part of the Total Force concept, members of the P
Res are required to meet the same standards as those
of the Regular Force. Reservists selected for service on
operations undertake mission-specific pre-deployment
training. This training occurs in conjunction with that
of any Regular Force personnel taking part in that
mission, thus promoting active-reserve integration.
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Several factors prompted the decision to adopt
the Total Force policy. First, supporters of the
concept wanted to save money by substituting lessexpensive reserve forces for more costly active-duty
troops. Second, they thought improved active-reserve
integration would enhance the military effectiveness
of Canada’s defense forces. In the 1970s and 1980s,
many reservists lacked specific wartime tasks and
suffered from inadequate equipment and training.
Finally, Canadian officials suspected they had failed to
exploit the full potential of their reserve components.
While most NATO countries had more soldiers in their
reserve components than on active duty, the Defence
White Paper lamented that Canada’s Regular Force was
four times larger than its Reserve Force.131
Canadian Reserve Forces have various multinational training opportunities with other NATO members.
The Canadian Directorate of Reserves has the authority
to sponsor up to six Primary Reservists to participate
in the two exercises that NATO conducts in most
years. The International Junior Officer Leadership
Development Seminar (IJOLDS), open to any
reserve junior officer with a rank higher than Second
Lieutenant, allows officers to “come together for the
purposes of sharing the common cultural values of
reservists, building teamwork within international
forces and expanding the personal and professional
horizons of participants.” Canadian reservists also can
participate in the U.S. Reserve Components National
Security Course (USRCNSC), which is open to senior
primary reserve officers with the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel or above.132
Within Canada, the military organizes three
different Reserve training courses. First, the Advanced
Logistics Officers Course (ALOC), open to P Res
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officers with certain qualifications (rank of major or
lieutenant commander, 1-month availability, etc.), is
offered twice a year. It “enhances the skills of personnel
and enable[s] them to be employed in command and
staff appointments by broadening their professional
knowledge in the theory and practical application
of logistics, resource management, and leadership.”
Second, the National Security Studies Seminar (NSSS)
gives six senior reserve officers an opportunity to
discuss theories and processes concerning national
and international affairs. Finally, the Lester B. Pearson
Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center
helps improve the performance of Canadian reservists
when they deploy on humanitarian missions and
post-conflict stability operations.133 The Department of
Defence tries to give all reservists who deploy to an
operational theater at least 1 month of pre-deployment
training.
Despite the long history of collaboration between
the Canadian and U.S. militaries, it was not until 1999
that the two defense communities began to discuss
reserve-specific issues on a regular basis. In that year,
the two countries initiated annual summits of reserve
officers. Their progress was most visible in addressing
issues relating to information sharing as well as
individual and unit exchanges. For example, the U.S.
Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command (USACAPOC) helped Canadians develop
their own capabilities in this area. Furthermore, the
Canadian Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR)
project has benefited from lessons and insights shared
at these meetings. Personnel and unit exchanges have
also been carried out under the forum’s umbrella.
Canada and the United States currently trade
instructors for military education courses. They also
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exchange students in the Joint Reserve Command and
Staff College and the Command and General Staff
Officers Course. Finally, both reserve communities
have expressed interest in creating a Reserve Officer
Exchange Program similar to those which already exist
between the United States and Germany, the United
States and the United Kingdom, and between Canada
and the United Kingdom.134 Unfortunately, the events
of 9/11, though highlighting the need for enhanced
bilateral collaboration on homeland security issues,
diverted attention from these initiatives. The military
reserve leaders of both countries have instead focused
attention on the large number of Canadian and U.S.
reservists serving on active missions in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere. On a more positive note, these
joint operations have enhanced mutual understanding
and dialogue between the American and Canadian
reserve communities regarding various operational
issues.135
The “Total Force” policy has not achieved all its
goals. The most comprehensive analysis of Canada’s
reserve components was the 2000 Fraser Report,
formally entitled, In Service of the Nation: Canada’s Citizen
Soldiers for the 21st Century. In the report, John A. Fraser,
the Chairman of a special committee charged with
assessing the state of the country’s reserve components
and policies, highlighted continued problems in the
training of Army reservists. In particular, the committee
found that, although the Army leadership had tried to
create “reserve-friendly” training packages, part-time
soldiers could rarely achieve the same standards as
full-time professionals. The Fraser Report offered a
series of recommendations regarding how to deal with
the training and other problems affecting the reserves.
These included shortening and simplifying the
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enrollment process, granting local reserve units more
leeway to design recruiting campaigns and schedule
training sessions optimized to their regions’ needs,
and creating alternative terms of service to attract more
volunteers.136
Since the publication of the Fraser Report, the
Defence Department has undertaken several projects to
overcome the substantial personnel shortfalls that persist within all elements of the Primary Reserve component. First, the CF Pension Modernization Project modified military pensions to reflect the increased demands
placed on reservists under the Total Force concept.
Starting in 2006, Primary Reservists can participate in a
new pension arrangement that is based on their full-time
or part-time military employment rather than whether
they belong to the Regular or Reserve forces. Second,
the Reserve Force Employment Project is reexamining
the use of reservists in military missions given the
continuing changes in the operational demands on
the Regular forces. Third, the Reinstatement in Civil
Employment Project has resulted in draft legislation to
protect a reservist’s employment during compulsory
call-ups, which occur more often under the Total Force
concept.137 Canadian law lacks specific provisions that
protect the civilian jobs of reservists—a practice at
variance with that found in most of the other countries
profiled. The government relies instead on a voluntary
program that encourages civilian employers and other
institutions to support reservists by providing either
paid or unpaid leave for Reserve Force Members
who need to undertake required training or military
duties.138
Perhaps the most important enhancement program
is the LFRR project. Since its implementation in October
2000, the initiative has sought to increase the strength
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of the Land Reserve and sustain it at this higher level.
The LFRR Strategic Plan has two phases. Phase One,
completed in FY 2003, “stabilized” the Army Reserve’s
organization and structure. The second phase, now
nearly complete, seeks to increase the size of the force
to 18,500 part-time soldiers from the Phase One total
of 15,500. Phase Two also seeks to give reservists
a better quality of life by improving their benefits,
administration, training, and support.139
On April 15, 2005, the Canadian government
released a major International Policy Statement (ISP)
that discussed how Canadian foreign and defense
policy would change to address the main challenges
of the post-Cold War world.140 In the area of defense,
the document stated that the government would
allocate 13 billion Canadian dollars for the country’s
armed forces during the next 5 years. The government
plans to use the additional funds to increase the size
of Canada’s reserve forces by 3,000 people (and the
regular forces by 5,000 personnel). The ISP will also
allow the government to complete implementation
of Phase II of the Land Force Reserve Restructure
Program (including the Medical and Communications
Reserves) and the raising of the force’s authorized endstate to 18,500 personnel.
In addition, the ISP will allow the government to
create additional specialized units in the reserve force.
For example, the Land Forces (army) plans to build
on the mix of military and civilian skills resident in
the Reserves (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear response, information operations and
civil military cooperation), as well as their presence
nationwide, to improve military support to civilian
authorities responding to domestic emergencies. The
armed forces plan to establish similar specialized
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capabilities and additional responsibilities in the
maritime and air force reserve units. Finally, the
government plans to augment the Canadian Rangers
to enhance Canadian sovereignty and security in the
north.
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CHAPTER 7
AUSTRALIA
Until recently, Australians saw their reserve
components as primarily a homeland defense force.
Originally called the Citizen Military Forces (CMF),
the reserves were primarily local militias designed to
defend Australian territory in the unlikely event of
foreign invasion. The Defence Act of 1903 explicitly
prohibited the Army from using the CMF in foreign
military operations. To circumvent that restriction in
past wars, Australia has had to require compulsory
military service and enact emergency legislative
exemptions on the use of reservists. After World War
II, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) tried to reduce
its reliance on its reserve components. The Defence
Act of 1974 changed the name of the CMF to the
Army Reserves to emphasize its “secondary support
position.”141
The end of the Cold War, the rise of global
terrorism, and Australia’s increased foreign military
engagements—the country’s armed forces, including
their reserve components, are cooperating more closely
with their foreign counterparts in multilateral military
operations than at any time in their history—have led
the government to rethink this policy.142 Australian
policymakers concluded they no longer needed
reserve components designed chiefly to provide the
basis for expanding the ADF into a force for waging a
protracted continental-scale military campaign. A 2001
amendment to the National Defence Act allowed the
government to employ reservists in foreign operations
ranging from disaster relief and humanitarian
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missions to major military campaigns. Since then, ADF
reservists have deployed in operations throughout
the world, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor,
Sudan, and the Solomon Islands. Currently, over 2,000
ADF reservists are deployed on international military
operations.143
At home, Australia’s reservists have provided security at major events such as the 2000 Sydney Olympic
Games, the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting, and the 2003 Rugby World Cup.144 In late
2003, the Australian Army created its first antiterrorist
unit, the Reserve Response Force (RRF), consisting
solely of reservists. Its 1,000 members help guard both
major events and Australia’s critical infrastructure.145 A
2005 Defence Update indicated that the government had
directed the ADF to develop Active Reservists “with
specific roles and tasks to support Australia’s domestic
security effort.”146
According to The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the ADF currently has a total reserve force of
18,973—with 15,000 members in the Army, 1,973 in the
Navy, and 2,000 in the Air Force.147 Those seeking to join
their ranks must be Australian citizens or permanent
residents seeking citizenship.148 The minimum length
of service varies depending on a reservist’s rank, skill
level, and military branch. Nontechnical applicants
join the military for 4 years, while General Entry
technical applicants have a 6-year commitment.
Officers have more flexibility; their contracts typically
range from 3 to 9 years, though Air Force pilots must
join for 12 years.149 Almost all (97 percent) reserve
positions are available to women.150 The ADF has
created the Australian Defense Force Cadets (ADFC)
as an umbrella organization for the three Service Cadet
programs. The ADFC is open to young people 12 1/2
to 18 years old. It seeks to encourage youth participants
72

to pursue military service through educational awards
and opportunities for accelerated promotion.151
Australia has six categories of reservists: (1)
High Readiness Reserves (whose members undergo
additional training and service obligations); (2) High
Readiness Specialist Reserves (who possess skills of
high value to the military); (3) Specialist Reserves; (4)
Active Reserves; (5) Standby Reserves; and (6) other
categories determined by each individual branch.
Most reservists fall into the fourth or fifth category.
Members of the Active Reserve are primarily designed
to supplement active-duty units, either through initial
force allocation or through reinforcement of deployed
forces. Legislation enacted in 2001, however, allows for
their use in any national emergency. Standby Reserves
are former members of the Regular Forces who do
not have a training commitment. Like members of
the Active Reserves, they are integrated into regular
military operations when mobilized, but they are only
called up during threats to national security or for
major foreign missions.
The government also recognizes four types of reserve service: ordinary service, voluntary unprotected
full-time service (who do not enjoy special job
protection), voluntary protected full-time service, and
compulsory full-time service (requiring a government
call up). Regardless of category, all reserves must be
available for “continuous full-time service” in a major
war. Most mobilizations, however, occur in order to
address national emergencies, help peacekeeping and
disaster relief operations, provide military support to
civilian authorities, or assist “significant national or
international activities.”152
Each branch of the military has unique training and
service requirements for its reserve component. The
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Navy requires a minimum of 20 days of training a year.
Its reservists can serve on active duty for up to 100 days
annually. Army Reservists usually train 1 night a week,
2 weeks a year, and 1 weekend a month. The Air Force
Reserve requires a minimum of 32 training days per
year, but some specializations demand as many as 60
days. Air Force Reservists can serve on active duty as
many as 130 days annually. In all branches, additional
training may be required for promotions.153
The Australian Army, like most Western militaries,
has since the 1990s relied increasingly on its reservists
to save money and supplement its overstretched activeduty units. It increased the size of its reserve component
by almost 4,000 people, while reducing the number
of regular troops by over 10,000.154 When ADF units
deployed to East Timor from 1999 to 2003, more Army
Reservists were employed in full-time service than
in all the years from 1945 to 1999.155 Smaller numbers
of Active Reservists have served in Rwanda (199495) and in Iraq (since 2003). Reservists are especially
heavily involved in the Defence Health Services. For
example, the majority of Australian personnel sent to
assist nations devastated by the 2004 Asian Tsunami
were reservists.156
The Army is undertaking a major restructuring of
the Army Reserves (ARes) as part of the Hardened and
Networked Arm (HNA) plan, whose implementation
is scheduled to last until 2015. The objective is to
improve reservists’ direct support of Army operational
units.157 The need to respond rapidly to unexpected
terrorist attacks and other emergencies also prompted
the Army to create the new category of High Readiness
Reserves. Their members commit to maintain elevated
readiness and serve a minimum of 2 years. The Army
organized these soldiers into small teams rather than
74

larger units in order to mobilize these reservists more
rapidly than in the past (within 30 days). Current plans
are to increase their number to approximately 3,000.158
Furthermore, the Army is also clarifying the chain of
command for its reserve components and specifying
how they will integrate with the Regular Army during
call-ups.159 The Army also is seeking to improve its
reserve training programs, with a new Active Reserve
Training Model designed to enable ARes members
to develop narrow but thorough skills in important
fields.160
The Naval Reserve (NR) historically existed to
augment the Permanent Naval Force. During World
War II, the Navy Reserves outnumbered the regular
Navy four to one.161 In 1990, the Royal Australian
Navy (RAN) decided to integrate completely its
reserve and active components as part of the RAN’s
total force concept.162 Of the current NR components,
Active Reservists work part time in the RAN, while
Standby Reservists, though not generally obliged
to work with the Navy, nevertheless are available to
do so occasionally. The NR is an integral part of the
Navy’s management structure, with Active Reservists
under Navy administrators and Standby Reservists
under divisional officers, called Regional Reserve Pool
Managers. The NR offers reservists billets both within
predominately reserve units (such as diving teams or
bands) and positions that involve routine interaction
with the Regular Navy (such as Medical Officers and
Seamen).163
As in the Army Reserve or the Naval Reserve, Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF) members on Standby
Reserve must have prior military service. In addition,
Active Reserve members wishing to become part
of an aircrew must also have active-duty experience
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due to the highly technical nature of these positions.
Unlike the Army Reserve and Naval Reserve, the
Air Force Reserve has additional branches for those
wishing to fulfill nontechnical and nonflying duties.
The Contingency Operations Reserve Group (CORG)
deploys nonflying support personnel to combat zones.
Their annual training commitment is 32 days each
year. The Ground Defence Reserve Group (GrDefRG),
which requires a minimum of 50 days training per
year, provides dedicated ground forces for Air Force
units. Finally, the Operational Aircrew Reserve Group
(OARG) consists of former active-duty aircrews who
maintain a high degree of readiness to support Air
Force flying missions. While the OARG only requires
32 training days per year, many of its members undergo
additional training to maintain their flying skills.164 The
RAAF also established a High Readiness Reserve (HRR)
unit to provide personnel who can deploy rapidly to
distant theaters. They receive specialized training to
enhance their integration into regular RAAF units.
Over the years, the government has taken steps
to improve reservists’ relations with their employers.
Despite continued complaints, public law until recently
did not protect the jobs of reservists who volunteered for
service. The Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act of
2001 now requires employers to grant their employees
leave for reserve training and outlaws discrimination
against employees or prospective employees serving
in the military.165 The Act created a new Office of
Reserve Service Protection to provide guidance about
the Act’s requirements to both reservists and their
employers. It also investigates and resolves disputes
arising from its provisions, provides extra help to selfemployed reservists, and seeks generally to enhance
reservists’ availability for military service.166 Each
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type of state protection for reservists—discrimination,
employment, partnership, education, financial liability,
and loans and guarantees—applies to a certain range
of reserve service. For example, protection against
discrimination applies to all types of reserve service,
while only mobilized reservists receive bankruptcy
protection.167 Since 2003, the government has required
the Australian Public Service to include provisions for
reserve leave in its job contracts.168
The 2001 Protection Act also guaranteed employers
that reservists would return to work as soon as their
service terms ended. In addition, the government
agreed to compensate employers for any losses resulting from their employees’ reserve service. The Employer
Support Payment Scheme (ESP), introduced in June
2005, offsets the cost of employees engaged in most
categories of ADF service. Its weekly compensation rate
is equivalent to the average weekly earnings of a fulltime adult Australian worker. The ESP encompasses
full-time, part-time, and self-employed workers
that meet certain conditions.169 The government also
provides employers with a weekly payment of about
$1,000 AU (U.S. $750) for each employee who is absent
performing military service. Employers of health
professionals can receive as much as $5,600 AU (U.S.
$4,200) per week per released reservist.170 The Defence
Reserves Support Council (DRSC) has committees in
each state and territory that educate employers about
their reservists’ service and reward excellence in
civilian and military work.171 The individual military
services have taken additional steps to make reserve
duty more palatable for employers. The training
requirements for the Air Force Reserve are considered
especially onerous and can often interfere with civilian
employment. To ease this burden, the Air Force has
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expanded its training facilities so that the required
courses can be completed locally. It has also reduced
the number of specialized training classes that must be
taken off-site.172
These initiatives appear to have achieved some
success. In a 2004 survey, only one-fifth of the reservists
employed in the civilian workforce reported difficulty
obtaining permission to participate in reserve activities
during workdays.173 Nevertheless, the ADF reserve
components continue to experience major recruitment
shortfalls. During the 2003-04 recruiting period, the
overall ADF reserve force achieved only 80 percent of
its recruiting target, with the Navy Reserve reaching
42 percent, the Army Reserve 84 percent, and the
Air Force Reserve 52 percent. This represented a
drop from the 85 percentage achieved by the reserve
force overall in the 2002-03 period.174 The shrinking
reserve force has become a matter of great concern
for Australian defense analysts. From 1995-2005, the
Active Reserve decreased by 24 percent. The Army
Reserve, which decreased from 24,500 in 1995 to 17,000
in 2004, has been most seriously affected.175 (The RAAF
Reserve actually grew from 1,500 in 1995 to 2,500 in
2005.) Widespread absenteeism within the reserve
components compounds this problem. Between 1999
and 2003, over 20 percent of reservists failed to report
for duty.176
Several explanations could explain the declining
number of reservists. The Army’s new centralized
and privatized system of recruitment, for instance,
has proved less successful than the prior system
relying primarily on regional reserve units to recruit
their members. Another factor may have been
the lengthening in the initial training period for
reservists, which recently increased from 2 to 6 weeks.
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Demographics may also play a role. Australia’s 18-25
year-old population is now smaller than at any time
since World War II. Finally, more positive factors may
be at work, including the country’s low unemployment
and vibrant economy as well as the voluntary entry
of many Army Reserve members into the Regular
Army.177
To increase the attractiveness of reserve military
service, the Kokoda Foundation, an Australian
military think tank, has proposed a National Security
Education Initiative whereby the government would
fund university studies for students who would
commit to serve in the reserves after graduating.178 The
government has thus far declined to implement such
an initiative. Instead, it has pledged to spend more
over the next decade on remunerating Active and High
Readiness Reserves through additional allowances,
improved health benefits, and annual completion
bonuses. It also will hire more civilian contactors
to perform nonoperational missions (e.g., logistics)
traditionally undertaken by reservists.179 Arguing that
Australia’s reserve components contribute little to the
ADF’s operational potential despite receiving about
$1 billion AU ($750 million) annually, critics favor
spending more on regular forces.180
The Australian government has pledged to spend
more over the next decade on remunerating Active
and High Readiness Reserves through higher salaries,
improved health benefits, paid public sector leave
policies, annual completion bonuses, and a new
“Academic Support Policy” for Reservists undertaking
post-secondary education at Australian universities
and colleges.181 It also will hire more civilian contractors
to perform non-operational missions (e.g., logistics)
traditionally undertaken by reservists.182 Critics who
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favor spending more on regular forces argue that
Australia’s reserves contribute little to the ADF’s
operational potential despite receiving $1 billion AU
($750 million) annually.183
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CHAPTER 8
CHINA
In recent years, China’s extraordinary economic
growth has enabled the government to transform
its military, the People’s Liberation Army (zhongguo
renmin jiefangjun; or PLA), into a potent armed force.
This year’s annual U.S. Defense Department report on
Chinese military power highlights that the PLA is in the
process of transitioning “from a mass army designed
for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to a more
modern force capable of fighting short duration, high
intensity conflicts against high-tech adversaries.”184
As Chinese military doctrine has evolved from
“people’s war” to “limited war under high-technology
conditions” to the new concept of network-centric
operations, the PLA has been developing its reserve
components to help provide the capabilities required
for the new missions.
During the past 2 decades, Chinese leaders have
sought to develop “a crack regular force with strong
reserve strength.”185 Like other great powers, China has
increased reliance on its reserve components (yubeiyi
budui) as it has reduced the size of its active-duty
(xianyi budui) forces. Although the PLA remains the
largest military in the world, consisting of both shortterm conscripts and long-term professionals, over the
last 2 decades China has downsized its regular forces
by millions of people. Furthermore, the Chinese Army,
Navy, and Air Force shortened their conscription terms
from 3 or 4 years to 2 years in 1999. Through these
reductions, the PLA seeks to field a smaller number
of better motivated and equipped active and reserve
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units capable of waging limited wars and combined
arms operations under modern conditions.186
The PLA’s reserve components, reestablished in 1983,
remain closely tied to their active-duty counterparts.
The original function of the reserves was to supplement
the regular Army in the protracted conventional conflict
of attrition envisaged by Chinese military doctrine—
either on Chinese territory or in adjacent regions (e.g.,
a renewed war in Korea or Vietnam).187 As the PLA’s
capabilities grew in sophistication during the 1990s, its
original land reserve component matured into separate
components for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Second Artillery Force (in charge of China’s nuclear
forces ballistic missile arsenal).188 The Central Military
Commission (CMC) testified to the reserve’s growing
importance in 1996 when it decided to confer military
ranks on reserve officers.189 In April 1998, the CMC
ordered the leaders of the country’s military districts
to expand the reserve units in their jurisdictions.190
At the end of 1998, the government amended China’s
Military Service Law to improve the status of older
reservists, aged 29-35, who could contribute desirable
skills to the country’s increasingly high-tech military.
In 2002, the CMC launched an initiative to improve the
effectiveness of the reserve units in China’s cities.
Today, China’s numerous reserve units—
organized into divisions, brigades, and regiments—
are incorporated directly into the PLA’s order of battle.
The PLA currently has an estimated 500,000 to 800,000
reservists organized into some 30 infantry divisions,
12 air defense divisions, and seven logistics support
brigades.191 A reserve infantry division, the largest
PLA reserve unit, contains more than 10,000 officers
and troops. Every Military Region now has a reserve
logistics brigade to support reserve and active-duty
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operations in the area. Their missions include assisting
with military maintenance, repair, transportation,
communications, and command and control.192
All reserve units have a small cadre of active-duty
personnel. They presumably administer the formation’s
affairs between mobilizations and serve as a nucleus
for reconstituting the unit during call-ups. Besides
reserve units operating as separate entities, either
independently or as components of larger formations,
the PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and
Second Artillery Force have assigned some reservists
to provide individual replacements for vacancies that
arise in active-duty units.193
The Chinese Military Service Law specifies that all
male citizens between the ages of 18 and 22 are liable
for compulsory active-duty service. Many Chinese not
conscripted have historically joined the People’s Militia
or People’s Armed Police (PAP).194 Reservists remain
predominantly former regular soldiers and officers
who have been discharged from active duty, but not
all demobilized PLA regulars join the reserves. In
recent years, moreover, reserve units have increasingly
included civilians who, because of various legal draft
exemptions, lack prior military experience yet possess
specialized technical skills of military value. Similarly,
a number of reserve officers are graduates of the reserve
officers training programs recently established in
China’s major civilian universities and high schools.195
Reserve officers are typically classified as either
Category I full-time reservists or Category II part-time
reservists. Category I reserve officers normally serve
as military commanders of company or higher-level
units, while Category II reservists usually function as
political commissars or technical specialists.196 When
they reach the age limit of their Military Service,
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reservists are expected to retire or join the People’s
Militia.
A nationwide network of Defense Mobilization
Committees—which integrate military, government,
and Communist Party leaders at all levels of
government—manages
all
reserve
activation
issues, including training and equipping reservists,
administering their call-ups, and transporting them to
their place of operation.197 The committees could serve
as the nucleus of joint military-civilian headquarters in
times of war or crisis.198 Each reserve unit falls under
the dual authority of both the PLA hierarchy and the
regional Party and government organs. In peacetime,
the Army reserve is subordinate to the provincial or
municipal commands, while the reserve units of the
PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery come under the
joint control of both the provincial commands and
the branch commands of the relevant Service. Upon
mobilization in wartime, they follow the leadership of
the commander of their designated active-duty unit.199
To enable reservists to fulfill their expanding military responsibilities, the government has increased the
money and time spent on their training and equipment. Reserve units now train directly with active-duty
PLA forces, using both traditional on-base training and
more advanced simulation and network training.200 As
in other countries, the PLA has traditionally exploited
the civilian skills of its members. For example,
reservists working in the civilian chemical industry
serve in chemical warfare units. China’s economic
transformation has been creating new high-technology
sectors in the civilian economy, especially in the area of
information technology. These developments provide a
basis for generating new reserve units (including highreadiness “fist” units) that can apply these advanced
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civilian skills to the military sector. For instance, during
the past decade, the PLA has created reserve units
specializing in advanced information warfare (IW) and
information operations (IO) whose personnel consist
largely of civilian telecommunications workers.201 The
U.S. DoD reports that civilian information technology
(IT) experts in reserve and militia units regularly train
and exercise together with active-duty forces.202
PLA reservists commonly participate in
disaster relief, emergency rescue, and post-disaster
reconstruction operations. Reservists with specialized
expertise in the areas of medicine and engineering are
especially valuable as supplementary first responders.
During the severe flooding in 1998, several million
reservists participated in relief efforts. More recently,
the government has mobilized hundreds of thousands
of reservists in response to epidemic diseases such as
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and natural
disasters such as forest fires and earthquakes. Reservists
involved in these operations fall under the command
of a joint military-civilian headquarters.203 In the case
of a domestic emergency, the authorities can also call
up reservists to assist civilian law enforcement bodies
with maintaining internal security. In responding to the
mass demonstrations that have become increasingly
common in China in recent years, however, the
authorities have preferred to rely on the local police or
other specialized internal security units rather than the
PLA.204
The March 1997 Law on National Defense describes
two components of the Chinese armed forces (wuzhuang
liliang) as having more prominent internal security
functions than the PLA. The first of these paramilitary
components, the People’s Militia (renmin minbing), still
maintains large part-time units that could also function
as a reserve manpower pool for the PLA during
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wartime. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
PLA General Staff jointly supervise militia affairs. Each
military area command is responsible for managing
the militia in its jurisdiction.205 In the 1940s and 1950s,
the militia constituted a key element of the people’s
war doctrine, playing a significant role in the CCP’s
victory in the Chinese Civil War. During the 1960s and
1970s, the militia worked closely with the PLA regular
forces to defend China’s territory from attack.206 In the
1990s, militia units provided labor at the Three Gorges
Dam and other key construction projects. The twomillion strong paramilitary Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps also operated farms and other
business in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,
while simultaneously maintaining security among
the discontented ethnic Uighur population.207 More
recently, the size and role of the militia have declined
as the PLA has become a more modern and mobile
force focused on conflicts along China’s periphery.208
At present, the People’s Militia performs primarily
rear area support. Its main responsibility is basic
area defense, which in some regions can include
protecting China’s borders and critical infrastructure
(e.g., transportation, communications, and energy
networks). The militia includes both ordinary and
“primary” members. The ordinary militia numbers in
the tens of millions, but its units have minimal training
and capabilities. The smaller primary militia has
approximately 10 million members. They receive the
bulk of the national government’s attention, training,
and funding. Members of the primary militia are
typically younger than ordinary militia personnel and
are more likely to have recently served on active duty.
Primary militia formations include rapid reaction and
specialized technical units. For example, the PLA trains
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and equips its special urban militia units to perform air
defense and infrastructure repair in wartime.209
The People’s Armed Police (PAP) (zhongguo
renmin wuzhuang jingcha budui) represents the third
component of the Chinese armed forces. Although
conscripted through the same procedures as the
PLA, the PAP employs an independent training and
education program. Its approximately 1.5 million
personnel fall under a military chain of command
as well as the authority of the central Ministry of
Public Security and the relevant local government
authorities.210 It has several types of paramilitary units
(an Internal Guards Corps, Border Defense Corps,
Forestry Corps, etc.) that differ in size, location, and
mission.211 Most units have internal security as a
primary duty. All PAP forces receive some training
in light infantry missions.212 Some of the most capable
PAP contingents had belonged to the PLA’s regular
forces before the 1990s. The PAP receives funding
from both central and local government ministries, as
well as from its own businesses, the fines it levies, and
specific institutions that use its security services (e.g.,
protecting a government building).213 In peacetime, its
main functions encompass infrastructure protection,
disaster relief, border control (including at inland
ports and airports) and internal security—including
countering terrorist attacks, controlling riots and other
mass disturbances, and guarding Chinese prisons.
The PAP also includes the State Guests Protection
Unit, which provides security for senior officials.214
In wartime, many PAP units probably would take on
additional missions. These tasks could include assisting
the PLA with local area defense and rear-area support
missions such as traffic management and population
control.215
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CHAPTER 9
JAPAN
The Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) is currently
in a state of flux. Seeking to manage the new threats
of the 21st century and remain interoperable with the
U.S. military, the SDF is becoming more agile and
technologically advanced.216 As part of this process,
the SDF reserve components are undergoing a
comprehensive transformation. During the Cold War,
the United States assumed complete responsibility
for defending Japan against external threats. Japanese
decisionmakers did not anticipate mobilizing their
military reserves except in a national emergency,
most likely a full-scale invasion of the homeland.
Since Japanese military planners considered this
scenario implausible, they regularly underfunded,
undertrained, and perhaps underutilized their reserve
forces. Sporadic training, low compensation, and a
weak officer cadre further relegated the SDF’s reserve
components to the periphery of the Japanese defense
establishment.217 During the last decade, however,
the changing nature of both the general international
security environment and the specific threats to Japan
has led the government to restructure and reinvigorate
the SDF reserve components.
Since Japan’s frustrating experience during the
1991 Persian Gulf War when Tokyo’s multi-billion
dollar assistance package yielded only disparaging
comments about “checkbook diplomacy,” Japanese
leaders have gradually expanded their involvement in
international security issues. In June 1992, the Japanese
Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law
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authorizing the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping
and international humanitarian relief operations
under certain conditions.218 The Japanese military
subsequently contributed to noncombatant UN
missions in Cambodia, Rwanda, East Timor, and other
post-conflict regions.219 Following Japan’s uncertain
response in 1994 to a U.S. request for assistance during
a possible confrontation with North Korea over its
nuclear weapons program, Tokyo and Washington in
1997 announced revisions to the Guidelines for U.S.Japan Defense Cooperation. Among other things, the
modifications specified that Japan would provide
“rear area support” and “operational cooperation”
(e.g., intelligence gathering, surveillance, and
minesweeping) for American forces “in situations in
areas surrounding Japan that will have an important
influence on Japan’s peace and security.”220
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of
October 2001, renewed in subsequent years, enabled
the SDF to dispatch warships to the Indian Ocean to
provide logistical support (primarily at-sea refueling)
for allied military operations in Afghanistan as part
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.221 It marked
the first SDF deployment in a theater of war. The
Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support Special
Measures Law of July 2003 permitted the government
to deploy ground troops in Iraq to provide logistical
support for the allied military campaign there. The SDF
contingent that served in Iraq from January 2004 until
July 2006 represented the largest and most dangerous
overseas Japanese military operation since World War
II.
Besides describing China and North Korea as
potential threats, Japan’s December 2004 National
Defense Program Guidelines stressed the need to improve
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the country’s ability to conduct joint military operations
with the United States in additional areas. In February
2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
(SCC) cited “the need to continue examining the roles,
missions, and capabilities of Japan’s Self Defense
Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond
effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated
manner.”222 A few months later, Japanese forces
participated for the first time in the Cobra Gold
military exercise with the United States, Thailand,
and Singapore.223 With 240,000 troops, extensive air
and naval power, and a $50-billion annual budget, the
SDF could provide key assistance to an overtaxed U.S.
military in certain East Asian contingencies.224
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been pushing to modify the traditional Japanese interpretation
of their post-war constitution, especially Article 9’s
perceived restrictions on Japan’s contribution to
collective self-defense activities, to allow the SDF to play
a greater role in improving the international security
environment.225 Amending the constitution would
require a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of the
Diet, as well as an affirmative majority in a subsequent
national referendum. Although this political process
could take years, Japan’s external security role will
likely continue to expand on a less formal basis as
long as the public continues to feel threatened. Alarm
over menacing North Korean behavior initially
motivated many of the changes in Japan’s regional
security policies, but growing concern over China has
substantially lessened traditional public apprehensions
about expanding the SDF’s roles and capabilities.226 A
December 2005 public opinion poll conducted by the
Nikkei Shimbun found that 69 percent of respondents
said people “cannot trust” China, compared with only
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14 percent who said China could be trusted. Only 35
percent of the 904 people polled said they could not
trust the United States.227
Although the Japanese continue to see China as
replete with commercial opportunities, recent Chinese
actions have alarmed Japan’s leaders and public alike.
During the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China launched
missiles in the island’s vicinity, threatening regional
maritime commerce. Some of the missiles landed
less than 100 kilometers from Okinawa.228 Only a
few months later, the sovereignty dispute between
China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands
revived. Since the late 1990s, Chinese ships have
conducted unauthorized “research” within waters
claimed by Japan, exacerbating their bilateral dispute
over exploratory drilling rights in undersea natural
gas fields in the East China Sea. In November 2004, the
Japanese detected a Chinese nuclear submarine in their
territorial waters. The government publication Defense
of Japan 2005 identified China’s military modernization
as potentially threatening and called on Beijing to make
its defense programs more transparent.229
Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines for
fiscal year 2005 reaffirmed the traditional SDF role of
defending against invasions of Japan’s offshore islands
and intrusions into Japanese airspace and territorial
waters. The Guidelines also recommended that the
SDF improve its ability to respond to new threats such
as attacks involving ballistic missiles, guerrillas and
special operations forces. Furthermore, they called
for enhancing the SDF’s capacity to forestall possible
disasters involving nuclear, biological, chemical, and
radiological materials.230 To respond to these new
challenges, the SDF has been seeking to substitute
quality for quantity throughout its ranks, especially in
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the reserves. For example, the government has raised
entry standards for new reserve recruits to attract fewer
inexperienced reservists and more SDF veterans.
The SDF consists of a ground, maritime, and air
service. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is the
largest of the three services, totaling some 148,300
personnel in early 2007. The Maritime Self-Defense
Force (MSDF) currently numbers 44,500 personnel. The
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has approximately 45,900
troops. The Central Staff amounts to 1,700 personnel.
The combined strength of the SDF reserve components
amounts to 41,800—33,800 in the GSDF Ready Reserve,
1,000 in the Navy Reserve, and 800 in the Air Reserve.231
In order to differentiate among reservists with varying
functions, skills, and experience levels, the Japan
Defense Agency (JDA) breaks down Japanese reserve
components into three categories: Regular Reserves
(normally called “Reserve Personnel”), High-Readiness
Reserves (normally “Ready Reserve Personnel”), and
Reserve Candidates (normally “Candidates for SDF
Reserve Personnel”).232
Regular Reserves are part-time SDF personnel—
normally engaged in full-time employment or study—
that perform mainly administrative, logistical, and other
support functions. In times of war or emergency, they
can substitute for active-duty units engaged in frontline operations by assuming responsibility for reararea security and logistical support. Regular Reserves
volunteer for a renewable 3-year term of service and
normally train only 5 days each year. Its members
typically have at least 1 year of active duty experience
or have graduated from “candidate” status.
High-Readiness Reserves consist of selected Regular
Reserves in GSDF and recently retired GSDF members
who agree to rejoin pre-designated GSDF units during
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an emergency. High-Readiness Reserves report for 30
days of training annually for a minimum of 3 years.
Since they receive more extensive training than Regular
Reserves, the JDA considers them most qualified to
join front-line active-duty units in combat operations
as well as in homeland security missions. The latter
can include responding to both natural disasters and
accidents (e.g., at one of Japan’s civilian nuclear power
facilities).233 Training programs for High-Readiness
Reserves are held on a number of separate occasions
throughout the year to accommodate reservists’ civilian
schedules.
The JDA created the category of Reserve Candidates
in 2001. The aim was to broaden the range of potential
military recruits, increase contacts between the Japanese military and society, and enhance the SDF’s access to
utilize professional and technical skills found primarily
in the civilian economy.234 Reserve Candidates are not
required to have served as regular SDF personnel, and
few have prior military experience. They are also not
liable to mobilization orders—only training call-ups.
The SDF divides Reserve Candidates into two subcategories: general and technical candidates. General
candidates perform support functions such as reararea security. After 50 days of training over the course
of 3 years, they graduate into the Regular Reserves,
with the same rights and duties as other members.
Technical candidates fill specialized positions such
as medical personnel, language experts, computer
experts, architects, and vehicle maintenance personnel.
After the successful completion of 10 days of training
in 2 years, the technical candidates advance into the
Regular Reserves.
The salary for each category of reserves differs
substantially. Regular Reserves receive 88,500 yen
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(U.S. $750) each year, consisting of 8,100 yen ($70) for
each day of service and an additional 4,000 ($34) yen
monthly allowance. Reserve Candidates receive 7,900
yen ($67) per day of education as well as allowances for
training call-ups. Compensation for High-Readiness
Reserves depends on the ranks and experience of each
individual soldier. On average, a High-Readiness
reservist receives approximately 600,000 yen ($5,100)
annually in personnel allowances, training call-up
allowances, and a continuous service incentive for
those who satisfactorily complete their 3-year service
commitment.235
These monetary incentives have proved most
attractive to Reserve Candidates. Since people
with no prior military experience can become
Reserve Candidates, university students often join
to supplement their incomes. In contrast, Japanese
recruiters have found it more difficult to attract HighReadiness Reserves. One reason is that Japanese companies, facing shortages of skilled labor, discourage
experienced former soldiers from committing to 30
days of annual training in the reserves. Although the
government now offers an annual subsidy of 500,000
yen ($4,250) per person to employers of active HighReadiness reservists, JDA officials still complain that
private employers discourage their best employees
from entering the military. A Japanese executive
reportedly told a JDA official that, “We must protect
our company before we protect the nation.”236 Lingering
anti-militarism also diminishes the attractiveness of
reserve or other military service. Conversely, so does
the lack of opportunities for operational experience
for those Japanese desiring to participate in either
peacekeeping missions or in combat scenarios. Until
now, the SDF has never called up its reserve components
except for training purposes.
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The transformation of the SDF’s reserve
components could facilitate Japanese participation in
U.S.-led security missions in the Asia-Pacific region.
In particular, reservists could apply their civilian
skills to joint post-conflict reconstruction operations
and humanitarian missions such as the December
2004 Asian Tsunami relief and recovery effort.
Surveys show overwhelming public support for SDF
participation in disaster-relief activities both within
Japan and overseas.237 SDF reservists could apply
many of the skills they develop for responding to
natural disasters toward managing the consequences
of terrorist attacks or human-made accidents. Japanese
reservists could also support maritime security and
missile defense missions in the regions surrounding
Japan. Even though their engagement in actual combat
operations is unlikely, their involvement would free
up American troops for other roles.238 To make such
operations more effective, however, U.S. and Japanese
defense planners should expand the involvement of
their reserve components in joint military exercises
and bilateral dialogue on potential East Asian security
contingencies. Establishing additional mechanisms
to exchange information on reserve issues—
including lessons learned, best practices, and future
transformation plans—could also prove profitable.
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CHAPTER 10
ISRAEL
Israel’s military reserve system provides an
indispensable base for sustaining the conscript and
professional superstructure of the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF). Since Israelis have historically found themselves
surrounded by potentially hostile countries with much
larger populations, they have designed a framework
for quickly mobilizing large numbers of battle-ready
forces in an emergency. As a result, Israeli planners
have traditionally treated reservists as core combat
troops—essential for any major operation—rather
than as supplementary forces.239 Israel requires almost
all active duty personnel to transfer to the reserves
after completing their regular service. The government
allocates considerable funds to educate, train, and
equip reservists (especially reserve officers) in order to
maintain them at a high state of readiness. It also invests
heavily in intelligence assets designed to provide
the military with the advanced warning required to
mobilize reservists rapidly in an emergency.
Israel’s military and civilian sectors overlap
considerably more than those of most countries. Large
numbers of conscripts and reservists continually cycle
through the IDF’s active-duty components. These
IDF regular forces consist of professional officers,
noncommissioned officers, volunteer soldiers, and
conscripts. The system of compulsory military service
obligates both male and female citizens, 18 years
or older, to serve on active duty in the IDF. Male
officers must serve in the regular army for 48 months,
male nonofficers for 36 months, and females for 24
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months. The main groups exempted from universal
conscription include male students of yeshiva religious
schools (who may defer entry as long as their studies
continue); religious females who choose to pursue
alternative national service; women who marry or have
children; members of most religious minorities (Druze
are liable for military service; Christians and Muslims
may volunteer to serve); and those deemed physically
or psychologically unfit.
The members of Israel’s regular army (Sherut Qivah)
number far fewer than the reservists (Zahal). Over the
past 25 years, the reserve components have accounted
for approximately 75 percent of Israel’s total military
manpower.240 Regular IDF members have varying
terms of active-duty service. Specialists (e.g., pilots)
typically must commit to multiyear contracts in return
for expensive government-funded training. The IDF
encourages most officers to pursue a civilian career
after the completion of military service. This practice
promotes a high rate of turnover in IDF leadership
ranks while keeping the military closely tied to the
civilian world. Israelis also believe that universal
military service helps integrate their large immigrant
population.
Most Israelis enter the reserves immediately
following a 2- or 3-year stint in the regular forces.
Until recently, most male reservists had to undergo
approximately 1 month of annual training until they
reached the age of 40. Certain specialists and some
former active-duty soldiers volunteer to serve in the
reserves until age 60, though combat soldiers often
transfer to logistical units when they reach age 35.241
Female reservists are liable for periodic training until
they attain the maximum age of 40, get married, or
have children. In practice, however, the government
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rarely calls up female reservists except for specialists
in military intelligence or other key fields.242 NonJews who serve in the regular forces are also liable for
reserve duty.
The Israeli military keeps the precise number of its
reserve and regular soldiers classified. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies estimates the IDF reserve
components at 408,000, with some 24,500 assigned
to the air forces and 3,500 to naval units.243 (The IDF
constitutes a single unified service with two semiindependent branches, the Israeli Air Force and the
Israeli Navy). The Institute for Advanced Strategic
and Political Studies estimates that Israel’s reserve
components have a natural annual growth rate of 3
percent due to such factors as immigration and birth
rates.244 In recent years, however, the IDF has sought
to reduce its reliance on reservists in combat situations
and decrease the overall number of reservists.
The Israeli government developed its mass
mobilization framework soon after the country’s 194849 War of Independence, when the army took months to
reach full strength. After visiting Switzerland, General
Yigael Yadin, IDF Chief of Staff from 1949-1952, decided
that Israel should develop a similar reserve system—
modified to fit Israel’s distinct circumstances.245 On the
one hand, Israel’s economic condition precluded the
possibility of maintaining a large standing army. On
the other, the country’s lack of strategic depth made it
vulnerable to a surprise attack—ruling out the Soviet
model of mobilizing enormous numbers of reservists
over the course of weeks and months.
Given these imperatives, Israel constructed a unique
system that relies on the rapid mobilization of large
numbers of well-trained reservists to complement its
smaller regular force. Most reservists are expected to
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join their units and acquire their equipment within 2448 hours of receiving a call-up order. Some specialized
units are required to mobilize even faster. The IDF
expects Air Force reservists, for example, to respond
within hours of a surprise attack. Their function is
to begin attacking enemy forces immediately while
also protecting less-ready IDF units undergoing
mobilization. For this reason, IDF regulations require
reserve pilots to fly a minimum number of hours each
month to maintain their operational proficiency. If
properly implemented, the present military reserve
system should be capable of mobilizing hundreds of
thousands of reservists within 2 days of a call-up.
For several years following Israel’s independence,
IDF reservists were organized into separate companies,
battalions, and brigades distinct from active-duty
units.246 The decision to abandon this model proved
advantageous in terms of both combat effectiveness
and civil-military relations. Under the current system,
reservists provide the IDF with a general source of
trained personnel rather than constituting a separate
branch of the military.247 One distinct advantage to
having such a large number of civilian reservists
serving throughout the IDF is that their presence helps
counter concerns about Israel’s transformation into a
militarized garrison state.248
To enhance unit cohesion, reservists have
historically been assigned to military formations
containing many of their former active-duty colleagues.
Since reservists typically train at most for only 1 month
each year, however, their weaponry skills frequently
lag behind those of the regular forces. To reduce the
impact of this gap, the IDF regularly combines regular
and reserve forces in larger units. For example, many
Air Force formations have a core group of conscript
and professional personnel who, in an emergency,
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are reinforced by reservists. Reserve officers occupy
leadership positions in all types of units.
During the early 1950s, reservists received training
and equipment inferior to that of the regular forces.
Following the 1956 Suez War, then IDF Chief of Staff
Yitzhak Rabin implemented measures to improve
reserve training and strengthen reservists’ combat
effectiveness. His initiatives helped transform the
reserves from a ragtag militia into a highly capable
force with an experienced officer corps and superior
equipment.249 Combined with Israel’s preemptive
approach to confronting external threats, the system
of rapid mass mobilization contributed to Israel’s
overwhelming military victory in the Six Day War of
1967. The government’s decision to delay mobilizing
the reserves in advance of the Yom Kippur War of
1973—due to economic and diplomatic concerns, as
well as incorrect intelligence assessments—almost
led to Israel’s defeat during the early phases of that
conflict.250 After this experience, the IDF increased
the size of its reserve components by, among other
measures, making it harder for Israelis to avoid military
service.251
General Yadin famously characterized the Israeli
reservist as a “soldier on 11 months annual leave.”252
Although Israeli legislation imposes general limits
on the number of days the government can call up
soldiers and officers each year, various emergency
laws have permitted reservists to serve for much
longer periods during wars and other crises. After the
1967 war, for instance, reservists were stationed in the
newly occupied Sinai Desert for several months at a
time, a situation that led the IDF to introduce a rotation
system.
The 1968 National Insurance Law established a
unique system—a National Insurance Institute—to
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compensate reservists who must leave their workplace
to perform their military duty. Before 1996, reservists’
wages came entirely from insurance premiums collected
from Israel’s employers and salaried workers. Since
then, the Institute has directly reimbursed employers,
who continue to pay reservists their normal salaries.
The Institute also compensates self-employed workers
up to a specified maximum amount.253 Besides this
insurance system, Israeli legislation grants various tax
breaks and other benefits to reservists, especially to
those mobilized for lengthy periods. Nevertheless, the
declining percentage of Israelis actually performing
reserve duty has led some of those who do serve to
complain about inferior pay, benefits, and other
treatment.254
To minimize the economic disruption caused by
mass reserve call-ups, Israel has established a series
of mixed civilian-military committees to consider
requests for deferment from reserve mobilization.
Certain strategic industries and services have been
declared so essential that their personnel regularly
receive exemptions from reserve duty. Government
pressure also has led Israeli universities to allow
student reservists to postpone examinations and
papers, receive special tutoring and photocopies of
lecture notes, and repeat courses for free whenever
their military commitments require them to miss an
excessive number of classes.255
Despite these accommodations, the large-scale
mobilization of reservists for protracted military
operations has proven severely disruptive to Israel’s
economy and society. The diversion of much of the
country’s workforce causes serious labor shortages
in certain sectors, a decline in economic activity due
to a loss of markets and clients, and abrupt changes
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in the supply and demand for various products.
Foreign investors and tourists also hesitate to enter an
active war zone. These financial burdens are so great
that, until recently, any widespread mobilization of
reservists almost required Israel to go to war soon
thereafter since the civilian economy would collapse
under their prolonged absence. As the 1967 Six Day
War illustrated, the social pressures ensuing from mass
mobilization could also pressure the government into
taking rapid military action.256
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 presented even
more problems for the IDF manpower system, which
posited only intermittent use of reservists in combat
operations. Based on their experience in 1956, 1967,
and 1973, Israeli military planners had anticipated
that after a few days of victories, the United States and
other foreign actors would pressure them to halt their
advance and negotiate a ceasefire. For this reason, the
IDF found it difficult to manage the burden of extended
occupation duties following the offensive stage of
the 1982 Lebanon intervention. Becoming entangled
in Lebanon impaired the IDF’s ability to prepare for
future wars, and the reserve forces had a plethora of
burdensome responsibilities. Among other missions,
they assisted regular soldiers in countering the Syrian
military, maintained order in occupied southern
Lebanon, patrolled roads subject to guerrilla attacks,
and prevented terrorist incursions into Israeli territory.
The prolonged mobilization of reservists placed the
overstretched IDF in a vulnerable strategic position.257
These pressures led Israel to withdraw its military
forces from Lebanon in May 2000.
As a result of its negative experience in Lebanon,
the IDF tried to reduce the frequency of lengthy
reserve deployments. Whereas in 1989 reservists
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served an average of 27 days in combat operations
and 20 days in noncombat duties (i.e., maintenance
and guard positions), the corresponding figures in
1994 were 21 and 13 days. During the 1983-97 period,
the number of conscripted soldiers increased by 46.3
percent as the IDF sought to become less dependent
on reservists by using more regular soldiers.258 By the
early 1990s, the number of summons to reserve duty
had decreased considerably. In 1988, reservists spent a
total of 9.8 million days on duty; by 1995, this number
had decreased to less than 6 million.259 The IDF also
lowered the maximum age of reservists in combat units
from 54 to 42 to ensure that only physically fit personnel
served on active duty. The dramatically increased costs
and time required to train soldiers to handle the latest
advanced military technologies also led the IDF to rely
more heavily on long-term professionals rather than
reservists.260 Those reservists who remained received
more sophisticated and specialized training. Perhaps
for these reasons, analysts estimated that in the late
1990s, roughly 10 percent of all reservists performed
80-90 percent of all active duty tasks designated for the
reserve components.261
The Palestinian uprisings in the occupied
territories—the first Intifada lasted from 1987 to 1993;
the second al-Aqsa Intifada began in September 2000
and continues today—ended a decade-long decline
in reserve call-ups. Although Israeli commanders
preferred to use specially trained career professionals
for delicate occupation tasks such as joint patrolling
with units of the newly created Palestinian Authority
(PA), the IDF’s regular personnel proved insufficient
both to police the territories and defend the country
against possible threats from Syria, Lebanon, and
Iran. When Palestinian terrorists began to launch
widespread suicide attacks against Israeli civilians
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during the second Intifada, the government found it
necessary to curtail most reserve training unrelated
to counterterrorist and occupation missions. It also
abandoned plans to shorten reserve duty.262 By 2001,
reservists comprised approximately one-third of the
Israeli troops in the West Bank and roughly 15 percent
of the troops in the Gaza Strip.263
The resulting increased mobilization of reservists
for occupation duties generated unprecedented
manifestations of dissatisfaction within their ranks. In
early 2002, approximately 100 reservists organized a
group protest against serving in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. They complained about an uneven distribution
of unwelcome police duties among reserve units and
about the perceived injustices associated with the
occupation.264 The authorities did not hesitate to punish
reservists on duty who committed acts of disobedience.
They argued that as citizens, reservists enjoy the
opportunity to help determine their government
through periodic democratic elections and therefore
must obey its decisions. Notwithstanding these
protests, in mid-2002 the IDF successfully mobilized
20,000-30,000 reservists in Operation HOMAT
MAGEN (“Defense Wall”). These troops reentered PAcontrolled territory in an effort to uproot the terrorist
infrastructure that had been supporting a destructive
wave of suicide bombings within Israel. Although
the government refused to authorize major funding
increases to improve reservists’ training or equipment,
it did create the new position of chief reserves officer,
with the rank of brigadier, to ensure that a senior IDF
commander would make reserve issues his or her sole
responsibility. Previously, the deputy chief of staff
managed reserve affairs as one of many duties.
The burden placed on reservists in the second Intifada
led the government to form a special commission to
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examine the status of Israel’s reserve components.
In October 2005, this commission recommended
drastically cutting the number of reservists assigned
to police functions such as operating checkpoints,
patrolling border infiltration points, and guarding
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. During
that year, when most of the regular army became
preoccupied with Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza
Strip, some 95 percent of enlisted reservists participated
in security activities in the occupied territories. The
October 2005 plan aimed to reduce the proportion of
mobilized reservists engaged in occupation missions
to 10 percent, while devoting more reservist training
to preparing for conventional wars and other major
emergencies. The expectation was that private security
companies would assume the role of guarding Jewish
settlements in the West Bank.265 In accordance with
this plan, the IDF dissolved some reserve units and
activated a declining number of others for combat or
guard duty during the first half of 2006. It also reduced
the number of obligatory annual service days from 30
to 14 and lowered the maximum age for enlisted male
reservists to 40. In 2005, Israel activated 30 percent of
its reserve force. In 2006, it had planned to activate only
20 percent—one of the lowest percentages in Israeli
history.266
The Second Lebanon War (July 12-August 14, 2006)
required the Israeli government to mobilize thousands
of reservists for urgent combat duty before the planned
changes had come into effect. In fact, Hezbollah
precipitated the war by kidnapping two reserve
soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, in a crossborder raid aimed at compelling a hostage exchange.
Although the Israeli government did not order a largescale mobilization of reservists until almost 2 weeks
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after the fighting began, the IDF eventually called up
over 30,000 reservists, who played an increasingly
important role in the ground war.267 By the time the
ceasefire took effect, reservists had suffered almost
half of Israel’s 117 military fatalities.268
The military’s failure to inflict a decisive blow
against Hezbollah led many reservists to protest about
equipment shortages, inadequate pre-deployment
training, poor military and political leadership, and
other problems.269 Some analysts believe the IDF
and its reserve components had become excessively
preoccupied with policing the occupied territories. In
this view, because their training and operations focused
so heavily on small-unit counterterrorist missions,
the reservists had neglected to prepare adequately
for large-scale conventional conflicts such as the war
in Lebanon during the summer of 2006.270 Another
common criticism was that Israeli planners had placed
excessive faith in air power and underestimated the
need for the large ground forces supplied primarily
by the IDF’s reserve components.271 Other observers
vigorously disputed these assessments, either
attributing the military’s difficulties to different factors
or arguing that the IDF performed better than its critics
claim.272
Members of the Israeli government have acknowledged the legitimacy of some of these criticisms. For
example, IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dan
Halutz said in retrospect that he would have called
up and trained reservists earlier in the conflict.273
Other Israeli commanders explain that budgetary
cuts and the expense of responding to the Intifadas
had required them to reduce spending on reserve
training, equipment, and logistical support.274 Internal
IDF committees, whose members include reservists,
107

have already begun investigating the most important
aspects of the country’s performance in the Second
Lebanon War, including the degree of preparedness in
both the reserve and regular forces.
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CHAPTER 11
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
In assessing Russia’s current military reserve
policies, a comparison with Soviet-era military
manpower policies (komplektovaniye vooruzhennikh sil’)
is instructive. Soviet doctrine and operational practices
continue to influence the policies of the Russian
Federation, whose senior officers were overwhelmingly
educated and trained in Soviet military institutions.
As one Russian defense analyst lamented, these
continuities mean that the main difference between the
current Russian military and its Soviet predecessor has
been the “inferior quality” of the former.275
In many respects, the Soviet military’s reserve
components served as the linchpin around which the
entire national military manpower system revolved.
Soviet leaders placed a high priority on maintaining
a large pool of well-trained military reservists. In their
eyes, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (USSR)
victory in World War II resulted from its ability to
mobilize more reservists than its opponents. Employing
fewer reservists and more long-term professionals or
short-term conscripts appeared impractical given the
protracted, large-scale conflict anticipated by Soviet
military planners. Sustaining a larger cadre of longterm professionals appeared too burdensome. In
addition, although many conscripts learned useful
technical skills (e.g., engineering, construction, machine maintenance) in the military that they could later
use in corresponding civilian sectors, the USSR’s laborintensive economy could not afford the diversion of
manpower that would have resulted from sustaining
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an even larger conscript force. Following centuries
of Czarist tradition, the Soviet Union developed one
of the largest conscription systems in history.276 With
few exceptions, millions of youth annually served
in the Soviet armed forces. More importantly, they
automatically joined the reserves upon completing
their obligatory basic service.
The reserve mobilization model led Soviet analysts
to adopt a different approach to military readiness than
the United States. For the Soviet General Staff, high
readiness meant being able to mobilize large numbers
of reservists rapidly rather than having all active-duty
units fully manned and equipped.277 In American
terms, the Soviets deliberately constructed a “hollow”
army. Many units listed in the Soviet order of battle
were intentionally undermanned. Some consisted of
only a small administrative cadre with limited organic
equipment. Soviet strategists developed detailed plans
to enlarge these units with complements of mobilized
reservists in a crisis. This system proved capable of
mobilizing thousands of reservists during the Soviet
military interventions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
in Afghanistan in 1979.
Ensuring that reservists were adequately trained
(as well as politically indoctrinated and subordinate
to civilian control) became a priority of Soviet leaders.
The over one million servicemen discharged annually
from active duty guaranteed that millions of reservists
would have up-to-date knowledge of Soviet tactics and
equipment. Soviet law placed reservists into various
categories depending on age, and required them to
inform the authorities of changes in their residency
and places of employment. The Soviet General Staff
would then periodically recall them for refresher
training, generally with decreasing frequency as they
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approached the maximum liability age (normally 50
years) for reserve duty.278 (The Russian Federation
continues to use this age-scaled system for reserve
call-ups.) The obligatory use of internal passports; the
extensive system of military commissariats responsible
for administering the human, transportation, and other
military assets in their jurisdictions; and the coercive
powers of the Soviet police state ensured almost
total compliance with these military notification,
training, and mobilization requirements. The USSR
also maintained an enormous professional military
education system in order to train the active-duty and
reserve officers required to lead the massive reserve
manpower that would be mobilized in a crisis.
Following the USSR’s collapse and the Cold War’s
end, many influential Russian officers and conservative
defense analysts initially strived to sustain the potential
to raise a large army (referred to as the “mobilization
resource” or “mobilization reserve”) capable of waging
a protracted conventional conflict with NATO.279 It
soon became apparent, however, that Russia could
not simply continue Soviet-era polices. Russia’s
disastrous experience during the first Chechen War of
1994-96—when the Army, despite supposedly having
some 70 divisions in its order of battle, could initially
only assemble a few ineffective “composite” units
consisting of men who had never trained or served
together—highlighted the acute need to establish a
new personnel mobilization system more appropriate
for modern Russian conditions.280 The demise of the
totalitarian system has decisively weakened the state’s
ability to force potential conscripts to serve. In addition,
the Russian Federation’s smaller population base and
more severe demographic problems, as compared to
the USSR, limit the number of potential conscripts.
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Finally, Russians have proved unwilling to devote
the tremendous financial and other resources that the
Soviet Union bestowed on the Red Army.
The Russian government has struggled with
the challenge of transitioning to a smaller, more
professional military since the first Chechen War.
Influenced by innovative reform proposals emanating
from both younger officers and civilian defense
analysts, Russian political and military leaders have
repeatedly pledged to eliminate compulsory military
service and transform the armed forces into an all- (or
almost all-) volunteer force.281 Yet, the Russian Ministry
of Defense (MOD) still relies primarily on conscripts.
Rather than restructure the military through extensive
rebalancing or reorganization, which could initially
require large government expenditures, the MOD has
merely reduced its size, sometimes by eliminating
units that existed largely on paper in any case. Today,
Russia’s armed forces still largely resemble a scaleddown version of the Red Army. The size of the activeduty military has declined from some five million
during the Soviet period to slightly over one million,
but volunteers account for only approximately oneseventh of the remaining personnel.282
In July 2006, President Putin signed a new law
requiring that, starting in 2007, all Russian male draftees
serve 18 months in the armed forces (down from the
prior requirement of 24 months), except for certain
occupations in the Navy, which require a longer term of
service. The long-awaited Law on Alternative Service
which the Duma passed in mid-2002, came into force in
January 2004. It formally allows genuine conscientious
objectors the right to undertake other forms of public
employment instead of military service. In practice,
however, the law’s stiff provisions discourage draftees
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from using it. The legislation requires several years of
low-paid public service and participants have little say
in their place or type of employment. The authorities
also reject many applications. Today, less than one
thousand Russians undertake formal alternative
service.283
The government has pledged to reduce the term of
service for new conscripts to 1 year starting in January
2008, with 6 months of training at a military base and
6 months of service in an operational military unit.
Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov has warned, however,
that cutting in half the service commitment without
increasing the number of volunteers could require
drafting approximately twice as many conscripts—
perhaps half a million per year.284 Many analysts
doubt that Russia can achieve this figure given its
already staggering recruitment problems. Experts also
expect the pool of available manpower to decrease
drastically as a result of Russia’s 20-year demographic
crisis. The country has experienced plunging birth
and soaring death rates, a sharp deterioration in living
conditions and medical care, and a surge in chronic
health problems among draft-eligible youth. Russia’s
Muslim minorities continue to have large families, but
the growing percentage of Muslim recruits represents
a mixed blessing due to their lower educational
levels and potential susceptibility to radical Islamic
doctrines.285
The unpopular war in Chechnya and frequent
media reports of hazing and other abuses within
the military have amplified Russia’s recruitment
problems. 286 Today, only about 1 in 10 eligible men
actually receive induction into the Russian armed
forces. For example, the spring 2004 draft yielded only
9.5 percent of those potentially available for military
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service.287 An extraordinarily large number of potential
draftees either receive legal exemptions (for reasons of
health, education, etc.) or dodge the draft by feigning
illness; buying phony educational deferments; going
underground; or, most commonly, by bribing members
of medical, university admission, or draft board
commissions. The individuals unable to exploit these
loopholes have tended to be less affluent, educated,
and healthy than the average Russian male. They also
have been more prone to drug use and other criminal
behavior, making it difficult for their commanders to
maintain discipline or conduct training.288 As a result,
less than one out of three inductees graduate from boot
camp. Ivanov himself has expressed concern over the
military reverting to a Bolshevik-era army of “workers
and peasants” since everyone else manages to avoid
serving.289 Poor living conditions, frequent harassment
of new recruits by second-year conscripts (known as
dedovschina, or “rule of the granddads”), and other
problems engender widespread dissatisfaction within
the ranks and frequent desertions.290 Whenever the
MOD, hoping to improve the number and quality
of servicemen, has moved to eliminate or reduce
exemptions to conscription, sharp public and media
reactions have forced its retreat. Surveys show that
the Russian public overwhelmingly supports ending
conscription and introducing other major reforms,
even at the price of higher defense spending.291
Russian analysts have debated expanding the use
of voluntary contract soldiers (kontraktniki) to reduce
the need for conscripts. Kontraktniki are not precisely
professional soldiers in the Western sense. Since 1992,
these nonconscript soldiers and sergeants have served
on multiyear contracts in return for much higher
salaries than regular soldiers (who receive about
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$3 a month), but many of them do not consider the
military their long-term profession. For this reason,
MOD officials often see them primarily as disposable
short-term mercenaries rather than as a professional
cadre that warrants costly training and education. The
performance of many of the kontraktniki in Chechnya
reinforced this perception. Motivated primarily
by financial rewards rather than patriotism, they
frequently deserted in dangerous situations or when,
as happened frequently under Yeltsin, the government
could not pay their salaries.292
The MOD might be able to attract more and better
kontraktniki if it devoted more resources to recruitment
(e.g., advertising) and offered volunteers higher salaries
and benefits (especially better food and housing). The
few hundred dollars a month kontraktniki now receive
as salary, even combined with the in-kind value of their
room and board, equates to less than what many of
them could earn from safer civilian employment where
they could also enjoy more flexible living conditions. In
recent years, however, the MOD has sought to reduce
the percentage of the defense budget devoted to meeting
personnel and maintenance expenses, while increasing
the share allocated to developing and procuring
advanced conventional and strategic weapons.293 This
approach complicates recruiting, let alone efforts to
transition completely to an all-volunteer force which
MOD officials and Western analysts have concluded
would cost hundreds of billions of dollars.294 In addition,
senior officers have resisted ending conscription since
it would weaken their almost absolute control over
conscripts, many of whom they treat like serfs. The
Russian media is replete with stories of officers using
the soldiers under their command for personal projects
like refurbishing their dachas or hiring them out to
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other employers in return for money or favors.295 A
reduction in aggregate military personnel, moreover,
would likely require involuntary retirements among
Russia’s traditionally top-heavy officer class.296 Finally,
ending conscription entirely would severely reduce
the pool of readily available reservists, since far fewer
Russians would have recent military experience.
The Putin administration’s current transformation
plan envisages creating a mixed system that in a few
years would combine long-term professional soldiers,
kontraktniki (who by 2008 will constitute a quarter
of the total military establishment, and over half the
Russian Army), and limited numbers of short-term
conscripted servicemen.297 Under this scheme, the
total number of active-duty personnel would decline
to approximately one million by 2016.298 The planned
force employment policy would exclude use of
conscripts in conflict zones and anti-terrorism missions
except during national emergencies. The MOD would
instead deploy professional soldiers and kontraktniki
to “hot spots” such as Chechnya and Central Asia
(where Russia has several permanent military bases).
These volunteers could also participate in UN- and
NATO-led peacekeeping missions, such as those in
the Balkans or Sudan. (These operations are popular
among kontraktniki because of the high wages typically
paid.) In early February 2005, the 15th Detached
Peacekeeping Motorized Rifle Brigade—manned
solely by kontraktniki and regular officers with good
foreign-language skills—became operational. This
special unit’s main purpose is to work with NATO and
other foreign militaries on international peacekeeping,
search-and-rescue, and counterterrorist operations.299
It remains uncertain whether such long-term
transformation plans will survive the presidential
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transition in 2008, when Putin is scheduled to
leave office. Past promises to shorten conscription
tours and increase the use of contract soldiers have
been promptly forgotten. Nevertheless, since less
comprehensive measures have proven insufficient
to overcome recruitment and retention problems,
incentives for fundamental reform will persist. For
example, few individuals have taken advantage of the
provision in Russian law that allows citizens of other
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) to obtain Russian citizenship by serving in the
Russian armed forces for 3 years on a contract basis.300
Although the new July 2006 law on military service
abolishes or limits the grounds for many deferments,
its practical effects in the face of widespread official
corruption and public indifference remain unclear.
During the month of the law’s enactment, the military
call-up did yield the desired number of conscripts, but
their poor quality (especially their medical problems
and low average education levels) led the authorities to
induct fewer than half of them.301 Federal, regional, and
local bodies have proven unable to inculcate sufficient
patriotism among Russian youth to motivate enough of
them to join the armed forces. Many Russian analysts
expect demographic, financial, and other imperatives
to necessitate further reform efforts even if the MOD’s
current transformation plans are fully implemented.302
The MOD continues to organize full-scale training
call-ups of reservists (colloquially referred to as
“partisans”) in all regions. A major task of the “Vostok2003” exercise was practicing the mobilization of
the reserves.303 In 2005, President Putin authorized
a training call-up of reservists in units of the regular
military, the Ministry of Interior, the civil defense corps,
the border guard, the Federal Security Service (FSB),
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and other federal security agencies for up to 2 months.
In September 2006, the MOD organized Southern
Shield 2006, a major exercise involving units in the
Volga-Urals Military District (consisting of the Perm
Territory, Udmurtia, and the Orenburg, Penza, Samara
and Sverdlovsk regions). Reservists provided 3,500 of
the 9,000 troops involved in the exercise.
The existing military service law permits the
government to mobilize reservists until they reach
the age of 50. The total duration of periodic training
cannot exceed one 2-month call-up every 3 years. The
law also limits the aggregate mobilization of reservists
for training call-ups to 12 months in total for their
entire period of service. Local government bodies and
the MOD split the costs and coordinate the timing of
routine training sessions. The MOD alone organizes
urgent call-ups in order to check a region’s readiness
to mobilize forces in emergency situations. Within the
MOD, the General Staff and the Military Inspectorate
determine the specific tasks to be exercised during callups.304
During these routine training call-ups, reservists
are organized into one or more separate units. They
receive 2-week training classes tailored to updating
the specialties they learned during their past conscript
service. They also typically participate in live-fire
shooting exercises. District military commissioners
continue to complain that approximately one-third
of all reservists ignore their call-up notices. Although
Russian law guarantees reservists their jobs and
average monthly pay, mobilized reservists are not
compensated for their loss of large “bonuses” and other
nontaxable compensation. Some Russian employers
also discourage valuable workers from serving. The
fine for ignoring a summons notice is small, and
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Russia’s preoccupied police rarely make tracking down
dodgers a priority.305
Mass draft evasion has negatively affected the
training of reserve officers. As a result of a 1989 law,
men who graduate from college and complete a reserve
officer training course can receive a reserve officer’s
commission without serving at all in the active-duty
forces. They only need to complete a reserve officer’s
training course.306 In order to help students avoid
conscription, and allegedly to collect fees and bribes,
higher educational institutions offer more reserve
officer training programs today than during the Soviet
period. Ivanov told the newspaper, Argumenti i Fakti,
that “If half of these were shut down, this would have
no effect on the Defense Ministry apart from saving
it money. The military departments produce more
than 50,000 reserve officers [annually]. The maximum
number of officers whom we call up for 2 years is
around 10,000.”307 The proliferation of these reserve
officer programs appears to have reduced the quality
of the average graduate—a worrisome development
given that the military plans to rely heavily on reserve
officers in any major conflict. In recent years, the MOD
has had trouble retaining junior officers. Almost half
of the Russian officers graduating from the country’s
military academies retire within 2-3 years because of
their inadequate salaries, low social status, and other
factors.308
The military effectiveness of Russia’s current reserve components remains unclear. Russia still benefits from the legacy of the USSR’s mass mobilization
system. According to The International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), Russia has 20 million potential
reservists, of which some 2 million have served on
active duty within the last 5 years.309 Yet, the country’s
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reserve components undoubtedly have suffered from
the general problems affecting the active-duty forces
and Russian society more broadly. Although Russia’s
protracted conflict in Chechnya has enabled many
reservists to gain “real world” operational experience,
it is unclear how broadly any lessons learned from
this conflict would apply to other types of missions.
Maintaining peace in Sudan, for example, requires
a different set of skills than killing guerrillas in the
northern Caucasus. (The recent experience of Western
militaries, however, has shown that such transitions
do not present insurmountable obstacles.) The harmful
effects of the Chechnya conflict on the morale and
mental health of its veterans is an issue that remains
understudied.
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CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSION—
THE GLOBAL RESERVE REVOLUTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. MILITARY
Several global forces are driving the worldwide
changes in military reserve policies. First, the end of
the Cold War has reduced the need for mass armies to
wage protracted military campaigns on a continental
scale. Military planners today require forces tailored
to combat terrorism, conduct peace operations, and
participate in other missions that, if not entirely new,
have become increasingly prominent since 1990. Second, the advent of “post-modern” military organizations—which are more open to females, manned by volunteers rather than conscripts, and less differentiated
from their civilian societies—has required considerable
adjustments in recruiting, retention, and other human
resources practices.310 Third, despite the demands of
the global war on terrorism, inflation-adjusted defense
budgets remain well below Cold War levels in most
countries. These funding limitations have led national
military establishments to reduce their overall force
structure substantially and, due to the belief that parttime soldiers cost less than regular troops, rely more
heavily on their reserve components.
This increased reliance on reserve components
presents national defense planners with many
challenges. Recruiting and retaining reservists has
become more difficult as many individuals have
concluded they cannot meet the increased demands of
reserve service. Reservists are increasingly deployed
on foreign missions at a time when expectations
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regarding their contributions to the management of
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other national
emergencies are growing. Defense planners must
also continue to refine the optimal distribution of
skills and assets between regular and reserve forces.
Finally, national governments must find the resources
to sustain the increased use of reservists without
bankrupting their defense budgets or undermining
essential employer support for the overall concept of
part-time soldiers with full-time civilian jobs.
Governments have adopted innovative responses
to the complications associated with their growing
use of reservists. To ease the pressures resulting from
the increased convergence of reserve and active-duty
deployment schedules, defense policymakers have
tried to make rotation cycles more predictable and
conducive to reservist lifestyles. For example, the
British Ministry of Defence has formally adopted a
policy of “intelligent selection” whereby it generally
solicits volunteers for any operation before resorting
to compulsory mobilization of reservists. Yet, MOD
officials also cite a need to provide reservists with
meaningful opportunities for participation in suitable
military operations. They have sought to make reserve
service more flexible and, by expanding the range of
categories of reserve service, allow individuals greater
opportunities to define their level of commitment.
Other countries are also seeking to offer individuals a
wider range of reserve service options and to facilitate
their transfer among the various reserve and active duty
components. Defense establishments are struggling to
find a happy medium that will enable them to avoid
overusing their reserve components while still keeping
them “simmering.”
The major military powers have widely adopted
“total force” policies that treat their active and reserve
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components as integrated if not totally interchangeable
elements—sometimes explicitly, sometimes just in
practice, but always with major implications for a
wide range of defense policies. National militaries are
altering the relationship between their reserve and
active-duty forces as they restructure both. Government
policies increasingly treat mobilized reservists and
regular forces similarly as they link more tightly the
two components. They are harmonizing the reserve
and active components’ organizational structures,
compensation packages, and rules and regulations. This
convergence is especially evident in the ground forces,
as seen in Australia, with its Hardened and Network
Army (HNA) Plan, and in the United Kingdom, with
its Future Army Structure initiative. Reservists now
train and fight alongside their full-time colleagues on a
daily basis, both at home and on foreign deployments.
This integration will likely deepen as defense ministries
take steps to facilitate transfers between their activeduty and reserve components, whether on a short-term
basis or permanently. Nevertheless, many reservists
still complain about their perceived second-class status
regarding training opportunities, the quantity and
quality of their equipment, and their treatment by field
commanders when deployed on active duty.
The convergence in the roles and missions of
countries’ reserve and active components invariably
raises questions over the appropriate distribution
of skills between the two. Since part-time soldiers
normally find it difficult to match the competencies
of full-time professionals, governments have had
to decide where the comparative advantages of
reservists lie. Although reservists continue to perform
traditional defense support functions, such as reararea security and logistics, they have also assumed
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new responsibilities. These novel tasks often reflect
the special skills and assets reservists can bring from
their civilian lives to their military roles. In many
high-technology fields, the capabilities available in
a country’s civilian economy exceed those readily
available in the defense sector. For example, Chinese
leaders have capitalized on their country’s technology
boom by organizing civilian information technology
(IT) experts into special reserve information warfare
units. Governments are developing databases to draw
more effectively on the diverse range of reservists’ skills
that might contribute to military operations (e.g., IT
experts for post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction
missions). One problem with this approach is that
many people join the reserves to pursue an occupation
different from that of their civilian jobs. For this reason,
several governments have adopted a formal policy of
not requiring reservists to perform the same functions
when on military duty as they do during their civilian
jobs, except in an emergency.
Many countries have decided to keep certain skills
predominantly in their reserve components, especially
those they find impractical to maintain in sufficient
quantity in their regular forces. For example, some
medical specialties are rarely needed in peacetime,
but become essential in wartime for helping severely
wounded soldiers. In several cases, defense planners
have assigned certain skills and missions exclusively
to reservists. Although this practice helps keep costs
down, the result has been a de facto globalization of
the Abrams Doctrine: It has become nearly impossible
for a country to go to war without mobilizing at least
some of its reserve components.
Reservists are often seen as providing an essential
link between a country’s military profession and its
civilian society. According to this view, reservists help
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transmit values between the two communities and
limit undesirable divergences between them (though
few people expect the military to try to seize power
through coups in the nations under study). One result
of this link is that national militaries have become
more susceptible to broader societal trends. In most
contemporary developed countries, for example,
force planners must deal with declining birth rates, a
growing population too old for military service, and
a decreasing interest in military careers among young
adults. Widespread changes in attitudes regarding
women, however, have provided military recruiters
with a new source of potential enlistees.
The declining size of many national reserve
components, combined with an increased tendency
for both regular and reserve forces to be drawn
predominantly from certain—often disadvantaged—
social groups, appears to have weakened the
effectiveness of this military-civilian link. In response,
foreign governments have restructured their reserve
components to expand opportunities for military
service. When the French government abolished
compulsory military service, it even created a new
reserve component, la réserve citoyenne, to sustain the
link between the French nation and its armed forces
that conscription was thought to have provided.
Another noteworthy development in civil-military
relations has been reservists’ increasingly important
role in helping ensure their fellow citizens’ safety and
security during domestic emergencies. Governments
are enhancing the capabilities, authorities, and missions of reservists to support civilian first responders following natural disasters, major accidents, and terrorist
incidents. For example, Great Britain has created 14
new Civil Contingency Reaction Forces for use in
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such emergencies. Officials increasingly recognize
that reserve components can supply unique niche
capabilities in this area. Reservists can offer emergency
responders advanced military capabilities and skills
without requiring them to depend on overstretched
regular forces, whose use at home could present legal
and other problems. In addition, they often have
excellent situational awareness due to their close ties
to the surrounding civilian communities. As in the
United States, however, foreign governments are still
defining the proper roles of their militaries in the area of
homeland security. The flawed response to Hurricane
Katrina stimulated the American debate over the
appropriate relationship between the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security. In France, China, and
Russia, the authorities are also constantly reassessing
the optimal division of responsibilities between their
armed services and their paramilitary forces (especially
the gendarmerie, the People’s Militia, and the various
Russian “power agencies”) in managing domestic
emergencies.
To ensure the ready availability of reserve units for
homeland security and other priority missions, many
countries—including Australia, China, Germany,
Japan, and the United Kingdom—have developed
“high-readiness” reserve components. Leaner militaries need to draw on reserves more rapidly than in the
past, especially those units that supply HD/LD assets
such as advanced IT support and nuclear, biological,
and chemical capacities valuable for managing the
consequences of WMD attacks. In return for higher
financial compensation, these reservists agree to
maintain exceptionally high readiness levels, typically
by training more than average, and to commit to longer
terms of service. Former active-duty service members
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are particularly valuable in this role given their
familiarity with their country’s most recent military
doctrine and tactics. Even countries that have thus
far resisted using a system of “tiered” or “graduated”
readiness for their active-duty forces have been willing
to apply this concept to their reserve units.
Providing these new capabilities invariably raises
the financial costs of the reserve components at a time
when most major military powers are cutting their
defense budgets. National military establishments
are reducing the size of both their active-duty and
reserve components, but the cuts in the regular forces
have typically been greater because reservists are
thought to be more cost-effective. As governments
spend more on training, equipping, and compensating
reservists, however, the cost differential between
the active and the reserve components decreases. A
particularly expensive development has been the
extension to reservists of health, education, and other
benefits traditionally offered exclusively to regular
soldiers. With the roles of reserve and regular forces
increasingly indistinguishable on the battlefield, it
becomes ever harder, both morally and politically,
to deny reservists perquisites enjoyed by active duty
soldiers. Overcoming recruitment and retention
problems among reservists has also become expensive.
To fill the ranks, governments have had to employ more
recruiters, fund additional advertising, and provide
more generous salaries and other benefits.
Governments also confront the increasingly
expensive burden of sustaining employers’ support
for the expanding obligations on their reserve
employees. On the one hand, the growing time
commitment demanded from reservists for training
and deployments has made them anxious about
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potential damage to their civilian careers, especially in
terms of job promotion and retention. At the same time,
competitive pressures have led even strongly patriotic
employers to complain about the costs of supporting
their frequently absent reservist employees. Most
governments have responded to these pressures by
both strengthening (or in some cases introducing for the
first time) legal employment protections for reservists
and providing much greater monetary compensation
and other benefits to their employers. A recent
development in some countries has been the formation
of institutions like the United Kingdom’s Supporting
Britain’s Reservists and Employers (SaBRE) program
or France’s Conseil Supérieur de la Réserve Militaire. Both
organizations regularly solicit employers’ views about
the country’s reserve policies and seek a solution that
benefits employers, reservists, and governments alike.
Still another factor that complicates determining the
relative cost-effectiveness of reservists is the difficulty
of evaluating the tradeoff between the lower average
salary of nonmobilized reservists and the various
legal and practical restrictions on their use for certain
operations (e.g., the typically longer time needed
for their pre-deployment training). It is more costeffective to keep certain infrequently needed specialist
skills predominately in the reserve components, but
recent experience has shown that defense departments
often underestimate their requirements for these
skills. Even when adequate aggregate capacity
exists, miscalculations have resulted in the frequent
mobilization of certain skilled reservists, leading to
increasing recruitment and retention problems until
governments “rebalance” their allocation of skills
between the reserve and active components.
Finally, calculating the costs and benefits for the
civilian economy is even more complex. When reservists
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perform their military duty, employers lose their
immediate services and incur costs related to hiring
replacement workers as well as paying for overtime
and temporary coverage. Yet, some personnel expenses
decline when the reservists go on leave. In addition,
civilian employers often benefit from the tangible (e.g.,
special training) and intangible (e.g., leadership) skills
that reservists acquire from their government-paid
training. The net effect of these disparate factors varies
depending on each case. Estimating their aggregate
effect across the entire national economy is more
complex—by an order of magnitude.
These trends have complicated efforts to assess
the actual costs of countries’ reserve components,
especially since many expenses apply to their national
armed forces as a whole. Fundamentally, it has become
much more difficult to conduct cost-benefit analyses to
determine the optimal active-reserve mix. In addition,
limited understanding regarding the economic and
other costs of maintaining and using reservists complicates assessing the advantages and disadvantages of
possible changes in national reserve policies. For
example, it is unclear whether extending additional
financial benefits to reservists would improve national
military capacity more than allocating those funds to
regular active duty units. At present, policymakers and
analysts tend to focus on the input side of the equation
(e.g., how much is spent on each component) rather
than on the outputs (how spending changes affect net
military capacity) since evaluating the effectiveness of
the latter is much harder.
The ongoing transformation in foreign countries’
reserve forces creates both challenges and opportunities
for U.S. defense planners. Since the end of the Cold War,
the United States has found itself joining with a much
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broader range of coalition members in multinational
military operations. The National Security Strategy and
other core U.S. security documents stress the need
to strengthen ties with friendly governments—both
to help other countries defend themselves better
(including against homeland security threats) and to
contribute to the management of common challenges.311
For example, the 2004 National Military Strategy
argues that, to counter the global threat of terrorism,
the United States must pursue “actions to shape the
security environment in ways that enhance and
expand multinational partnerships. Strong alliances
and coalitions contribute to mutual security, tend to
deter aggression, and help set conditions for success in
combat if deterrence fails.”312 For this reason, the 2005
National Defense Strategy states that the DoD is “working
to transform our international partnerships, including
the capabilities that we and our partners can use
collectively.” The objective is “to increase our partners’
capabilities and their ability to operate together with
U.S. forces.”313 At a minimum, American defense
planners will want to keep abreast of how key foreign
militaries are changing their reserve components. In
some cases, the DoD might consider applying suitable
foreign innovations to its own reserve policies.
To improve the effectiveness of these multinational
operations, American forces should take steps to
enhance their interoperability with a wider range
of potential partners. Most foreign governments
recognize the value of undertaking multilateral
military operations with the United States and should
be open to cooperative initiatives embracing their
reserve components. If better interoperability were the
only concern, the United States and other countries
could restructure their militaries to achieve symmetry
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in form, function, and organization. Realistically,
however, the influence of history, geopolitics, threat
perceptions, and other more weighty factors means that
the basic structures of national militaries are largely
fixed in the near future. For this reason, cooperative
initiatives should aim for limited improvements that
nevertheless could contribute meaningfully to actual
military operations.
Reservists can help strengthen technical
interoperability, which improves when engineers,
weapons designers, and other defense experts work
together to research and develop military technologies.
More subjective forms of interoperability—such as an
appreciation of the other parties’ preferred tactics,
techniques, and procedures—typically require close,
frequent, and sustained military-to-military contacts.
Since other demands on reservists’ time invariably
limit their ability to participate in long-term residential
exchange programs such as the Army’s Military
Personnel Exchange Program, organizing additional
opportunities for multinational military exercises,
reciprocal visits, and other short-term contacts might
prove more practicable. In special cases, resources
might become available to fund longer-term exchanges
for a few select reserve officers and other personnel.
As with other issues, managing the competing time
pressures on part-time soldiers requires compromises.
The United States and its traditional allies—
NATO in Europe; Australia and Japan in Asia; and
Canada closer to home—have made some progress
in enhancing military interoperability through joint
research and development programs, combined
training and education, and other multilateral security
cooperation initiatives. These existing activities now
need to encompass countries’ reserve components
131

more comprehensively. National defense planners
are increasingly assigning important military skills
predominantly—and
sometimes
exclusively—to
their reserve components. Even for short operations,
commanders of multinational forces will likely need
to access at least some of these skills, especially those
relating to logistical support, information technology,
communications and foreign languages. To sustain
enduring peace and post-conflict reconstruction operations, governments will find it even more necessary to
mobilize reservists to maintain sufficient manpower.
Multinational operations would also benefit from
the different perspectives and experiences reservists
bring from their civilian careers and their stronger ties
with local communities. Their background can prove
especially useful in helping with the difficult transition
from military- to civilian-led stability operations.
By working with reservists, regular soldiers deepen
their understanding of reserve issues and broader
societal trends. Involving foreign reserve components
more comprehensively in multilateral exercises with
U.S. forces would facilitate mutual awareness of
national military doctrines, concepts of operations,
communications protocols, and other standards.
Establishing additional mechanisms for dialogue
on reserve issues would broaden opportunities for
exchanging information regarding lessons learned,
best practices, and future transformation plans.
The 2006 QDR Report notes that, “Recent operations
have reinforced the need for U.S forces to have
greater language skills and cultural awareness. It is
advantageous for U.S. forces to speak the languages of
the regions where the enemy will operate.”314 The DoD
Defense Language Transformation Initiative, along
with single Service initiatives to enhance cultural and
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language training among their personnel, aims to
enable U.S. forces to work more effectively with foreign
militaries.315 For example, the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps are strengthening their foreign language training, cultural learning, and Foreign Area Officer program to “form a professional cadre of officers with regional expertise and language skills to provide support
to Fleet Commanders, Combatant Commanders, and
Joint staffs.” The Navy sees these skills as essential
for enabling its personnel to understand the “human
terrain” of its international operating environment.316
The new U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Michael Mullen, has stressed that partnerships with
foreign navies effectively give the United States access
to a “1,000-ship navy.” He told an audience in June
2006: “Imagine the power of having a cadre of foreign
area officers who understand the language, build
friendships, engender co-operation and undermine
the very conditions often exploited by those who wish
to fracture the peace.”317 Ties among American and
foreign reservists could help develop international
military relations in many areas, especially in those
fields where they predominate—logistics, combat
support, and intelligence. For example, U.S. reservists
responsible for military intelligence (which includes
linguists) could take advantage of their foreign
counterparts’ geographic expertise to generate insights
concerning regional security developments, including
data on local terrorist threats.
Many U.S. military exchange programs remain
focused on traditional allies and have neglected new
and potential partners. The United States needs to
deepen defense contacts with foreign militaries that
have not historically worked closely with American
military forces. Although joint operations with the
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Chinese PLA are unlikely to happen soon, joint U.S.Russian operations are more plausible. Both Russia
and the United States are contemplating humanitarian
relief missions in distant and perhaps nonpermissive
environments and even combined operations to secure
or destroy WMD assets under risk of terrorist seizure.
The International Military Education and Training
Program (IMET) already provides training in English
for Russian military officers and civilian MOD officials
in peacekeeping operations, noncommissioned officer
development, civil-military relations, and other topics
designed to enhance such interoperability. These
programs could be expanded and, with Beijing’s
approval, extended to the PLA.
The Russian and Chinese armed forces are
admittedly difficult military partners. Their lack of
transparency, distrust of American intentions, and
other long-standing problems continue to complicate
U.S. attempts at engagement.318 The 2006 QDR Report
rightly highlights the importance of “shaping the
choices of countries at strategic crossroads”—a phrase
used to describe Russia and China as well as India.319
Despite these difficulties, efforts at cooperation should
continue. Although it can take years to reshape former
adversaries’ deep-rooted perceptions and practices,
delays will only postpone the achievement of this goal
even further. The armed forces of China and Russia will
remain important national actors for many years given
their size, resources, and bureaucratic influence. It is
precisely because Russia and China are neither allies
nor adversaries of the United States that military-tomilitary contacts and other forms of bilateral defense
diplomacy are both necessary and possible.320
Since 1993, many National Guard State Partnership
Programs (SPP) have established collaborative defense
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relationships with former Soviet bloc countries. (The
SPPs have since expanded to encompass countries
which are new U.S. military partners in Asia and Latin
America.) These programs now encompass a range
of security cooperation activities including military
exchanges, training opportunities, and joint programs
to deal with such security threats as narcotrafficking
and natural disasters. The activities are coordinated
through the appropriate Theater Combatant
Commander and U.S. embassy country teams. They
aim to promote mutual understanding and trust,
enhance participants’ military capabilities, showcase
American political and civilian values, and achieve
other important objectives. The recent expansion of the
military dialogue with China might allow for the
establishment of an SSP with China, perhaps using
the same informal mechanisms linking the New York
National Guard to Russia.321
The protracted deployments of American military
forces in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and
Iraq have led the U.S. Government to develop new
tools for such post-war occupation missions. In 2004,
the Bush administration established the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the
State Department. The Office aims both to strengthen
U.S. civilian planning for stabilization operations and
to improve interagency coordination during actual
deployments. Its 55-member interagency staff has
consisted of personnel on loan from DoD, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and other U.S. Government offices
as well as career State Department employees.322 In
November 2005, the DoD officially defined “Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations” as a “core U.S. mission” warranting equal
priority with combat operations. The directive
underscores the importance of promoting foreign
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language training, regional area expertise, and ties
with foreign governments and nongovernmental
organizations.323
Reservists appear particularly suited for foreign
constabulary, peacekeeping, and post-conflict stability
operations because these missions tend to require
less advanced fighting skills and more civilian-type
reconstruction, civil affairs, and related capabilities.
To improve the foreign language proficiency and
international awareness of U.S. military personnel,
DoD will now require recipients of Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships and Service
Academy students to take courses in foreign languages.
DoD also plans to create a 1,000-person Civilian
Linguist Reserve Corps that would be readily available
for military operations.324 Its members would make
excellent candidates for participation in foreign military
exchanges. Since these reservists would already know
their target language, moreover, they would not need
to undertake lengthy language training in foreign
countries—an impossibility for most reservists.
Through their security cooperation activities
with foreign governments, reservists can also
promote peacetime efforts to shape regional security
environments. The focused Theater Security
Cooperation Strategies of the regional combatant
commands (e.g., U.S. Pacific Command) should take
better advantage of their possible contributions. For
the same reason, reservists could also assist with the
U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative designed to
increase friendly governments’ military capabilities
and their interoperability with U.S. forces. Another
way reservists can contribute to strengthening
defense relationships between the United States and
other countries is to establish liaison arrangements
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with foreign military headquarters and with foreign
government agencies responsible for reserve affairs.
U.S. military exchange programs could also be better
coordinated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Staff need to reduce redundancies, eliminate
gaps, and exploit synergies in what remain largely
individual Service-driven programs. Furthermore,
DoD, the National Security Council, and other senior
U.S. Government bodies could adopt additional
measures to enhance coordination of international
security interoperability efforts across the U.S.
national security establishment.325 DoD would also
need to devote sufficient resources to entice greater
participation in these efforts from both active and
reserve members. For example, reservists who join in
engagement activities with foreign militaries could
receive such tangible benefits as credit for promotion
and, where possible, subsequent assignments that
utilize their experience and expertise. If American
defense planners genuinely appreciate the need to
expand contacts with foreign militaries, including their
reserve components, they need to show it.
Besides optimizing the participation of reservists in
exchanges and other mechanisms to promote military
cooperation between the United States and potential
coalition partners, DoD should also evaluate certain
foreign reserve practices to ascertain if they might
profitably be applied, suitably modified, to the U.S.
reserve components. Any such application would need
to take into account the differences in countries’ military
commitments, active/reserve force mix, human and
financial resources, and other criteria—including the
different implicit “social compact” underpinning the
roles of each nation’s citizen soldiers.
First, it might make sense to establish a formal
category of “high-readiness” reserves who—in
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return for greater financial benefits, better training,
and more opportunities to serve—would agree to
undergo additional mandatory training and deploy
immediately if needed. The 2006 QDR Report states
that DoD will “[d]evelop select reserve units that
train more intensively and require shorter notice for
deployment.”326 The Military Services have already
launched several pilot programs to expand the
number and types of variable reserve participation
at the unit level. More comprehensively, they have
restructured reservists’ deployment schedules,
making only a selected group of them subject to
mobilization during certain time periods. These units
undergo concentrated training preparation in order
to reduce the time required for mobilization and
deployment. Unlike a traditional tiered-readiness
system, however, the Service rotation systems for both
the active and reserve components anticipate that
over time all military personnel will endure periods
of high readiness. The DoD should evaluate whether
the increase in predictability and preparedness that
could result from formally designating certain military
personnel as “high-readiness” reservists would
outweigh the corresponding monetary costs and the
possible invidious effects on other reservists, who now
would be seen, even if not formally so labeled, as “low
readiness” components. Now that the United States
is adjusting the length of its reserve deployments,
moreover, perhaps DoD planners should consider the
Israeli practice of more frequently rotating reserve
units in and out of combat theaters. Such a practice
helps ameliorate overuse of reservists, but may prove
impractical given the global extent of U.S. military
deployments. It is considerably easier for IDF reservists
to return to combat zones in neighboring territories
than for American reservists based in the United States
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to move back and forth to overseas operations.
Second, DoD might wish to evaluate in greater
detail the applicability of certain foreign innovations
to strengthen employer backing for reserve
participation. The Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), adopted
in 1994, has helped achieve its three objectives of
facilitating part-time military service by full-time
civilian employees, guaranteeing the reemployment
of discharged military personnel, and preventing
discrimination against individuals because of
their military service—primarily by acting as an
ombudsman to mediate disputes. Nevertheless, the
United States might benefit from adopting certain
foreign practices in this area. For example, the United
States might want to organize a formal body like
France’s CSRM that would periodically arrange largescale conferences of government officials, employers,
and other interested parties to discuss the condition
of the reserve components and recommend possible
improvements. In addition, U.S. entities such as the
National Committee for Employer Support of the
Guard and Reserve (ESGR)—a DoD staff group that
has established a nationwide network of voluntary
local support committees—might consider adopting
certain elements of Britain’s SaBRE program to help
sustain private sector support for reservists and
facilitate resolution of employer-employee problems
concerning employees’ military obligations.327 Finally,
although DoD has abandoned plans to establish an
insurance scheme designed to compensate reservists
or employers who suffer losses from the mobilization
of their reserve employees, Israel, Japan, and other
countries have acquired several years of experience
with such subsidy programs that might provide
139

insights for any future U.S. Government endeavors in
this area.
Third, the U.S. Government might also wish to follow
Canada, France, and other countries in developing
new initiatives to bolster high school recruitment into
the reserve components. Since the late 1990s, France
has required all French citizens between the ages of 16
and 18 to spend a day at a nearby public facility (often
a military base) at the government’s expense to learn
about the French defense establishment, including
opportunities to serve in the reserve components.
Only those who complete the program receive the
documents they need to take the national entrance
examinations required for higher public education
institutions and many government jobs. Although DoD
reserve recruiters have a broad range of techniques
at their disposal, they might benefit from adopting a
more extensive program designed to expose young
Americans to career opportunities in the military and
its reserve components.328
More generally, foreign experience might help U.S.
human resource managers as they attempt to apply the
“continuum of service” concept to the U.S. military.
This concept was advocated most prominently in
the December 2002 “Review of Reserve Component
Contributions to National Defense” study, mandated
by the 2001 QDR. The concept seeks to deemphasize
the inflexible binary choices commonly available in the
past (active/reserve; full-time/part-time; etc.). Instead,
it attempts to offer military personnel expanded
opportunities to move into, between, and within active
and especially reserve duty categories—with varying
time commitments and other obligations in return for
corresponding levels of benefits—as their personal
interests and circumstances evolve.329 On the other
hand, attempting to copy France’s innovative Citizen
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Reserve would probably not prove useful given the
lack of a conscription tradition in the United States.
Furthermore, the United States already has a range of
intermediary bodies (think tanks, military associations,
etc.) that attempt to maintain a link between U.S. society
and its armed forces. In any case, the U.S. National
Guard already performs many of the representational
and public education functions that the French have
assigned to the réserve citoyenne.
Finally, the growing number and prominence of
private contractors on the battlefield has complicated
the management of American military operations. For
example, the higher take-home pay received by many
civilian specialists may have led some highly trained
military personnel to join these private sector firms rather
than the reserves.330 Another problem associated with the
use of civilian contractors is their lesser accountability
as compared with mobilized reservists, who fall under
the military chain of command and the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ). On several occasions in
Iraq, private firms have postponed or abandoned
their tasks when their operating environment became
excessively dangerous.331 The rules of engagement for
contractors remain unclear, as do the law enforcement
mechanisms that apply to them. DoD representatives
currently depict private contractors and reservists as
two of the four key elements of its Total Force (along
with its Active Component and civilian employees).332
In October 2005, the Department issued more detailed
guidance for some of these questions—such as when
military personnel are obliged to defend contractors,
what type of armaments contractors can carry, and
when private security contractors can guard U.S. or
allied facilities or personnel.333
Thus far, the United States and other governments
have relied on a combination of patriotism and
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bonuses to discourage reservists from joining civilian
contractors. The British, however, have established
the innovative category of “Sponsored Reserves” to
ensure that certain key civilian contractors deploy
as reservists in support of foreign military missions.
These individuals are liable for mobilization when
their skills are required for military operations, such
as when their technical expertise is needed to maintain
complex weapons systems. U.S. defense planners,
who depend more on private contractors than perhaps
any other country, have just begun a pilot program to
assess how a sponsored reserve scheme might work
in the Air Force Reserve in such fields as intelligence,
space operations, and U.S.-based logistics.334 DoD
analysts should comprehensively evaluate the British
system, including its possible contribution to other
missions. Ideally, sponsored reservists might help
secure the presence of essential civilian support assets
even in non-permissive environments such as Iraq.
Their presence might also allow for the expanded
use of private contractors in cases when the nation’s
inherently limited number of reservists is needed for
more urgent duties—as has increasingly become the
case.
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